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Review of:

Madison's Managers: Public Administration and the Constitution by Anthony M. Bertelli, Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2006
Pages: 244. $60.00

A Reasonable Public Servant: Constitutional Foundations of Administrative Conduct in the United States by Yong S. Lee, David H. Rosenbloom
M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 2005
Pages: 320. $32.95

Reviewed By: Steven Cann
Reviewed in: Public Administration Review
Date accepted online: 02/11/2007
Published in print: Volume 67, Issue 04, Pages 780-782
See all reviews for this journal

Book Reviews: The Administrative State, the Exercise of Discretion, and the Constitution

Both of these books are about the exercise of discretion, albeit from different perspectives. Madison's Managers: Public Administration and the Constitution outlines a broad theoretical precept of managerial responsibility that is peculiar to our constitutional democracy. A Reasonable Public Servant: Constitutional Foundations of Administrative Conduct is a more practical, down-to-earth discussion of constitutional law that seeks to educate public managers so that the exercise of discretion remains within constitutional boundaries.

Both books begin with a discussion of what happens when the exercise of discretion goes awry. Anthony M. Bertelli and Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., remind us that citizens who have been adversely affected tend to take their complaints to elected representatives or interest groups with superior access to policy makers-or else to the courts. The result is, all too often, micromanagement (micro-mismanagement?) or injunctions, and the consequences of either are rarely "better public management and heightened trust in government" (2). The prescription is to recruit the "right" kind of people into public service in order to create a "repository of responsible legislative agents who will exercise discretion within the confines of the separation of powers" (164).

In the foreword to Yong S. Lee and David H. Rosenbloom's A Reasonable Public Servant, Rosemary O'Leary recounts recent abuses of discretion that have made the news (and the courts): violations of prisoners' rights, police engaged in racial profiling; a state environmental manager unilaterally modifying an agency regulation, a public school coach unilaterally ordering urine tests, a university denying a Web page to a religious student organization, and a state social service agency giving a family the choice between relinquishing custody of an autistic child or forgoing mental health assistance for the child (xiii). To amplify the bad publicity generated by these acts, someone or some public entity was sued. In some cases, it was the individual bureaucrat, whereas in other cases, it was a government agency. The prescription is to teach more about the law and the Constitution in programs that prepare public managers so that they will be less likely to cross the line.

Each book is concerned with the Constitution, but from different perspectives. The constitutional focus of Madison's Managers is, as the book's namesake implies, the separation of powers. The authors are concerned with democratic responsibility. They argue that bureaucracy should behave as the legislature's agent, functioning as the "means for the purposeful achievement of collective purposes" (9), with respect for the roles of the other branches of government. This should be accomplished through a renewed emphasis on the personnel function in public administration, recruiting public servants with the proper "public service values." Democratic responsibility is also informed by administrative law, which sets the rules for "administrative practices within the separation of powers."

For Lee, the constitutional focus has to do with the concept of immunity from legal liability. The Supreme Court has created the concept of qualified immunity-that is, public employees and their employers are protected (immune) from lawsuits so long as the exercise of discretion comports with the Constitution (or what the Court says the Constitution says). Public employees, and sometimes their employers, lose that immunity when actions fall outside constitutional mandates. Lee is concerned that there is widespread ignorance among public employees regarding where that line is.

Madison's Managers

More than a decade ago, Robert Reich (1994), former secretary of labor and now an economics professor, argued that volumes had been written about making judicial review compatible with democracy, but very little had been written about making the administrative state compatible with democracy. Madison's Managers is an attempt to fill that void. Bertelli and Lynn construct a constitutional theory of public administration that is unique to the United States. They argue that although theirs is not the first normative theory of public administration, in the context of recent literature, theirs is unique because it is grounded in Madisonian and therefore constitutional principles.

As with any broad theoretical piece, there are certain assumptions that a reader must accept before adopting the theory. With Madison's Managers, one needs to accept that whatever Madison and his colleagues drafted in 1787 was "democratic"-that is, constitutional equals democracy. The reader must also accept the notion that it is bureaucracy's lot to be kept on a short leash by the legislative branch (see, e.g., Denhardt and Denhardt 2003). Finally, one needs to accept some of the basic tenets of social choice theory and game theory.

Bertelli and Lynn argue that the early public administration literature had it right. "The serious study and practice of public administration originated in the efforts of educated, bourgeois reformers to replace administration that was ...no better than 'a convenient tool for the spoilsman,' with something more professional and democratic" (18). They posit that a good deal of that early literature searched for a legitimate role for public administration within a constitutional scheme. Moreover, they argue that the early literature had a Madisonian ring to it, as much of it was concerned with perfecting the institutions that control factions on behalf of the "public interest" (16). Bertelli and Lynn go on to argue that the subsequent behaviorist literature, which was critical of the early writings, was misguided, and current public administration literature, with its emphasis on best practices is also misguided, as it is not grounded in the Constitution and is ignorant of administrative law.

Bertelli and Lynn's volume intends to establish a precept of managerial accountability. It does this primarily through an extensive and exhaustive review of the literature in the areas of public administration that influence the precept. This is a highly theoretical work. The precept dictates that when legislative power is delegated, discretion should be exercised with the following axioms derived from the literature: judgment, balance, rationality, and accountability.

Because the separation of powers is central to the precept, Bertelli and Lynn criticize current public administration literature for its neglect of administrative law. In chapter 4, they discuss administrative law as it relates to the fit between constitutional constraints and the precept.

How the system will produce public managers who will exercise discretion according to the precept is the focus of the final three chapters of the book. The personnel system is the basic mechanism for ensuring that those who receive legislative delegations possess the proper characteristics to exercise discretion in a constitutional sense. The personnel system should also work to ensure that the "right" kinds of people are attracted to public service. To appreciate how all of this will work, the reader needs some familiarity with social choice theory and game theory. Those who have difficulty with the assumptions of social choice and game theory will probably remain skeptical regarding the precept.

Whether or not one buys in to the highly theoretical assumptions, this book is a passionate argument for democratizing the administrative state. The argument needs to be heard in the academies in which public administrators are trained. By way of a recent example of how the administrative state can take on a life of its own that is not consistent with democracy, consider the case of ergonomics. For years, labor and progressive groups pressured the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the U.S. Department of Labor to promulgate rules regarding the prevention of repetitive stress injury in the workplace. Business groups lobbied just as hard in the opposite direction. Finally, near the end of the Bill Clinton administration, OSHA promulgated such rules, which were expected to be the most costly in the agency's history. The Republican majorities in Congress, apprehensive of a Clinton veto, bided their time until a more sympathetic occupant of the White House was sworn into office in January 2001. The Republicans passed a congressional review bill that forbade OSHA from regulatory activity in the field of repetitive stress injury, and President George W. Bush signed it into law. Apparently undaunted by this flurry of legislative activity, OSHA adopted, without Administrative Procedure Act hearings, "voluntary" rules and, by 2005, had conducted thousands of inspections and issued citations for violations of the voluntary regulations (Morgan 2004). Someone needs a good dose of Bertelli and Lynn's Madison's Managers!

A Reasonable Public Servant

By way of contrast, Lee and Rosenbloom's A Reasonable Public Servant focuses on the illegal or unconstitutional rather than the undemocratic. What OSHA did appears to be inconsistent with representative democracy, but it is by no means clear that OSHA acted outside the law. The basic premise of Lee and Rosenbloom's book is that graduate schools in public administration are failing the public managers they train because those managers will be vested with discretion but lack the basic knowledge of how to exercise it. This is because few courses in basic public law are required in public administration curricula.

The U.S. Supreme Court, by common law (Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 [1971]), and the Congress, by statutory law (42 U.S.C. 1983, Civil Rights Act of 1871), make individual public employees personally liable for violating the constitutional or civil rights of citizens. Public agencies at the local level have also been made liable by Supreme Court interpretation through the concept of vicarious liability (an employer may be liable for the acts of its employees). Public employee and agency liability for violating the civil rights or liberties of citizens is what the law calls a constitutional tort.

However, the Supreme Court has created qualified immunity for individual public employees (but not local agencies) who commit constitutional torts. If a public employee commits an act that violates a citizen's constitutional or civil rights, the employee might not be liable if he or she acted without malice or if the employee did not know nor should not have known that his or her actions would violate a citizen's rights. Notice that the second prong of the test implies a certain element of knowledge about the Constitution and civil rights. In such a case, a judge instructing a jury about whether the employee "should have known" would not be unreasonable in telling jurors that they could assume anyone with master of public administration degree and limited administrative experience "should have known." The problem is, of course, that although the judge might not be unreasonable in his or her assumptions, the judge would almost certainly be wrong. Most public administrators, unless they have gone out of their way to get it, probably do not "know"-but certainly should be expected to "know"-and that knowledge is the essence of A Reasonable Public Servant.

What follows is a partial listing of areas of law of which a mid-level manager should have a working knowledge-and will gain a better understanding of from reading this book:

Liberty interests and property interests under due process of law

How much process is due in an internal due process hearing

Intersection between the two items above and employee termination and discipline

What kinds of public employee speech are protected

Citizen and public employee interests in privacy

Citizen interests in privacy involving information about them (this involves Fourth Amendment law)

Citizen and public employee expectations of privacy, generally and in the workplace

Searches or inspections based on suspicion versus the special needs doctrine

First Amendment rights of students in public schools

Privacy rights of students in public schools

Three-tiered analysis of equal protection

Racial discrimination

Gender discrimination

Age discrimination

Discrimination based on other socioeconomic characteristics

Sexual harassment

Affirmative action-not just based on race but also on gender and other criteria

Americans with Disabilities Act

Only through a basic understanding of public law can public employees protect themselves from their employers and avoid committing simple mistakes in the exercise of discretion that could lead to a lawsuit. Lee and Rosenbloom warn that "it is not enough ...that the public agency hires a legal counsel to represent it in court .... Those in nonhierarchical positions ...must also have a good working knowledge of constitutional and statutory rights. The reasonable public servant at all levels must keep abreast of the ever-changing constitutional law and integrate the relevant principles to his or her job performance" (240).