| Review of: | State and Church in Western Europe in an Administrative-History Perspective (19th/20th Centuries), |
|---|---|
| Reviewed By: | Naomi Caiden |
| Reviewed in: | Public Administration Review |
| Date accepted online: | 02/11/2007 |
| Published in print: | Volume 67, Issue 2, Pages 343-366 |
Faith and Government
Policy makers in the United States might regard state-church relations as a settled matter, perhaps needing a little fine-tuning around the edges.
It may not be easy for contemporary readers to appreciate the historical dominance in Europe of what we loosely call "the church." Churches were powerful because of their near monopoly on literacy, their capable organization, their hold on the loyalties of the population, and their wealth. Raadschelders traces many of the characteristics of modern government-territorial organization, bureaucracy, responsibility for social services, and ideas of universality, egalitarianism, and social justice-to church organization and ecclesiastical resistance to autocracy. Maybe so, but there is also a less favorable record of church dominance: intolerance, inquisition, persecution, dogmatism, personal enrichment, violence, exclusion, and bloody religious wars. There were good reasons for the secularization of the state and its subordination of organized religion to the sphere of individual conscience.
It is difficult to do justice in a short space to the rich and careful narratives through which the contributors to this volume explain the roads taken by different countries during the 19th and 20th centuries. A few examples must suffice to illustrate the importance of religious issues and institutions in politics and public administration during the development of the modern state. Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet describes how the legacy of the French Revolution in 1789 divided religious and secular in a bitter political conflict among clerics, monarchists, and reactionaries on one side and anticlericals and republicans on the other. There were related conflicts between Catholics and Protestants concerning the access of the latter to public services, which even, as Sandrine Dhont's chapter documents, reached into the hospitals (383). The turning point was the law of separation of 1905, but even then, as Vida Azimi relates, acute turmoil continued, and her chapter on Paris during those difficult years highlights the role of the various Parisian administrations in improvising and inventing "a flexible and conciliating doctrine of action" to maintain calm and order (381).
In Italy, Alessandro Ferrari analyzes three stages of relations between the Italian governments and religious denominations. From the unification of the state until a little beyond World War I, a liberal regime allowed for individualism and separation. The Fascist regime under Mussolini restricted the free exercise of religion and recognized Roman Catholicism as the only established church (58-60). Following World War II, under Christian Democrat governments, the sovereignty and independence of church and state were recognized (64). Despite constitutional guarantees, unrepealed Fascist-era legislation still granted the Roman Catholic religion preference (sometimes called a "new confessionism") until the mid-1960s, when the staging of Rolf Hochhuth's play
Frits M. van der Meer and F. Pieter Wagenaar chronicle "The Disentanglement of State and Church in the Netherlands." Under the Dutch Republic (1579-1795), the virtual monopoly of the Dutch Reformed Church gave way to tolerance of sizable minorities, but education, marriages, and charity remained in the hands of the different churches (88-89). Under the Napoleonic occupation (1795-1815), constitutional recognition was given to all religious beliefs, and church and state were formally separated, but it took some time to work out the practical issues (90-91). Upon the Restoration, the king swung back toward a policy of intervention in religious matters, but the adoption of a constitution and parliamentary system at midcentury provided for freedom of religion and autonomy of religious institutions (94-95). Yet the tension between religious freedom and religious participation in the provision of public services, particularly education, persisted at least until the 1960s (96).
There are other fascinating stories: Nigel Yates's history of the retention of the established church in Britain and Ireland; Stefan Schima's analysis of Austrian laws between 1867 and 1918 that (inter alia) required children "to be educated in the doctrine of a recognized church or religious society" (381) and Stefan Korioth's follow-up on conflict regarding Catholic teaching in Prussian schools (383); Heinrich de Wall's explanation of how Protestant churches in 19th-century Prussia and Bavaria "almost were indistinguishable parts" of the state governments (381); José María Vázquez García-Peñuela's account of the collaboration of state and church in the economic sphere in 19th-century Spain (384); and Allen D. Hertzke and Kevin R. den Dulk's discussion of the First Amendment in the United States.
In the end, solutions followed similar lines, though with some exceptions and variations: Churches would be autonomous, religious freedom would be guaranteed, and secular governments would provide public services on a universal basis. So, if we all end up at more or less the same place, why should we care how we got there?
First, the struggles involved in state-church relations shed light on the development of democratic institutions. The nation-state is not the only focus of loyalty or source of values for its citizens (let alone all of its residents). Centralized governments emerged from competition with feudal powers, fragmented polities, and religious institutions. As public administration developed, the latter lost ground to secular authorities but remained politically and administratively significant, as witnessed by the existence of religiously based parties in several countries (7). In recent years, as centralized public bureaucracies have been excoriated, it has become fashionable to extol the usefulness of "civil society" and "government by network" for the provision of public services. The history of state-church relations reminds us that such relationships are not merely instrumental-that the institutions of organized religion have their own agendas, independent of (and not necessarily congruent with) those of democratically elected governments. Conversely, when totalitarian governments assert sole power over their subjects and demand obedience from all other societal institutions, history shows that organized religion may be all too easily enlisted to serve the purposes of the state.
On a broader canvas, the formative European experience of state-church relations, though varied, may contrast with different religious cultures in other parts of the world. The development literature has stressed institution building as a vital element of modernization and democratization. What should be the place of institutions of organized religion in economic and social development, particularly in the development of public administration? Can we even assume coherent, centralized religious organizations based on the Western major church model? What about organizations in which religious and other purposes blur-those in which fundamentalist and political agendas combine with practical social service and educational functions to produce "a state within a state"? What recognition should be given to religious institutions and parties that seek to hijack the state?
There are also practical problems. As contemporary social life becomes increasingly atomized-alienation, greed, loss of civic consciousness-and governments find themselves unable to cope with societal dysfunctions, the role of nonprofit organizations in supporting the social fabric has grown together with public financial support. In several countries, churches finance their activities at least partly through public budgets, a general religious tax, grants, or tax exemptions (7). Should religious schools be entitled to the services of specialized teachers at public expense (or even to declare their own school districts)? Should publicly funded vouchers be available for religious schools? Should religious associations have access to public property, prisons, and hospitals? What conditions should be attached to their receiving public funds for welfare services of various kinds?
Broader policy issues concerning religious beliefs and practices are by no means fully resolved, even in Western countries. The United States is a case in point, as governments are being drawn into the same issues over which religious authorities have asserted jurisdiction for their own members-the nature of marriage and family, the conception and ending of human life, the education and socialization of children, the responsibility for the poor and destitute, and the rights and obligations of citizenship. Where religious beliefs collide with public policy, there are no simple solutions, and organized religion does not play a passive political role.
Finally, with mass immigration, the religious landscape has become more diverse:
Since the legitimacy of government action is a central concern for and challenge to liberal democracies, the study of public administration cannot ignore the integration of new populations into societies and polities that, until some 50 years ago, were fairly homogeneous and grounded in a shared Judeo-Christian heritage. (5)
Previously, arrangements for minority religions could follow a number of paths, none of which would disturb the major compromises between secular and religious authorities: Public policy could treat minorities as exceptions, allow for exemptions, deny or ignore their rights altogether, or rely on assimilation (or persecution) to minimize problems or demands. But today, prevailing state-church compromises are being challenged. Public institutions such as schools, prisons, courts, hospitals, newspapers, and even sports, have become battlegrounds over customs, symbols, religious practices, and alleged discrimination. Governments are drawn into these conflicts as a matter of public policy, and their decisions inevitably favor one side or the other. Minority populations may win acceptance of different religious or cultural norms, or the majority population may demand the continued dominance of mainstream religion, values, and national character. Even in the United States, where the First Amendment might be thought to have settled issues of religion, questions over the accommodation of religious needs and government support of religious practices, symbols, and services still arise (275-95). Perhaps these explorations into state-church relationships in the development of Western democratic government may provide some ideas and guidance for the path ahead.
This volume of the