In his history of environmental political thought in the U.S., Our Limits Transgressed (1992), Taylor observed that the environmental ethics literature had paid less attention to the relationship between environmentalism and political theory than it had to the relationship between people and nature. One notable exception to this generalization is the cumulative work of Peter Wenz, whose latest book is an informative and accessible overview of the field for both theorists and practitioners.
The major theme of Environmental Ethics Today is "environmental synergy," the possibility of reconciling environmental ethics with political values. Three examples are the synergies between 1) bio-diversity and human welfare, 2) respect for nature and environmental justice, and 3) preservation of nature and a stewardship interpretation of the Bible. The overview in the first two parts of the book demonstrates how many theories are either human-centered or centered on the intrinsic value of nature. This bipolar tendency leads to the perception that one must choose between human and non-human interests. The third part of the book challenges that perception, while the fourth and last section addresses practical applications of environmental synergy.
Anthropocentrism
Wenz's overview of environmental ethics theories is organized on a continuum, beginning with the strongest human-centered (anthropocentric) and ending with the strongest non-anthropocentric theories. The author begins by examining the argument that the free market can reduce global scarcity of natural resources by means of higher pricing to limit demand and catalyze innovations in environmental management (22). He reviews the classic thesis from Garrett Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) that self-interest is the primary motivator of environmental preservation, because unless people own the land they graze or otherwise cultivate they will allow public areas to deteriorate from over-use. Logically, each individual will be motivated to compete with others for profits from the commons even though the collective result is a long-term reduction of land to sustain everyone's herds.
Extending this logic to the issue of over-population leads to a form of "life-boat ethics" in which feeding an ever-growing number of people world-wide is likened to adding too many passengers to a life-boat while the ship is sinking. Similarly, exporting food to poor, over-populated countries will only encourage further population growth and, ultimately, ruin the earth's capacity to support anyone (30). Wenz summarily dismisses such logic, noting that world hunger stems from food distribution problems, and that it is possible to use the planet's food-producing capacity efficiently by modifying the meat-rich diets of wealthy individuals in the U.S. and other industrialized nations (32).
The second perspective that Wenz examines along the continuum from strong anthropocentrism to strong non-anthropocentrism is the theory of obligations to future (human) generations. He begins by noting that society must base such obligations on factors other than market relationships, since future generations are not yet born. Furthermore, cost-benefit analysis "discounts" future dollar benefits or burdens based on the interest rate, and it discounts the future value of human lives as well. Thus, while a theory of obligations to future human generations based on cost-benefit analysis avoids the strongest form of self-interested behavior evident in the market, it still favors a single individual human life existing in the present to the possible future harm to millions caused by the short-term perspective of many public policies (56).
The third and weakest anthropocentric perspective on environmental ethics is non-economic, such as the human aesthetic interests harmed by exploitation and damage to nature. In this context Wenz discusses preservation of national parks and wilderness areas based on their human aesthetic appeal, the experience of nature's sublime (even divine) qualities (71), and the claim that human encounters with nature can transform values from the narrowly materialistic to the broader and more fulfilling interest in nature for its own sake (73).
Non-Anthropocentrism
The field of environmental ethics includes a variety of theoretical perspectives that value animals or ecosystems for themselves, apart from their contribution to human welfare, and therefore constitute a challenge to market-based solutions to environmental issues. Animal welfare and animal rights are non-anthropocentric approaches because they are primarily concerned with the basic interests of, and duties to, non-humans; however, the philosophical arguments on which they are based are extensions of traditional human ethics.
Arguments against cruelty to animals are based primarily on an extension of utilitarian ethics. "According to utilitarian theory, then, actions are right or wrong, good or bad, according to how they affect the experiences of beings capable of experience" (85). His main objection to this approach is that it elevates maximizing net pleasure (of both humans and animals) as the sole moral principle while neglecting concerns about social justice, liberty and other political values.
While utilitarian ethics extend to all sentient beings an interest in avoiding pain, animal rights theories make stronger non-anthropocentric claims. In his assessment of animal rights theories, Wenz acknowledges that killing animals for medical research is a difficult ethical issue, and the potential benefits make it "hard to resist," but he points out that almost all the benefits of animal research go to a small percentage of the human population who can afford sophisticated health care (123). Thus he concludes that animal rights are potentially compatible with social justice concerns, alluding to the major theme of environmental synergy that is fully developed in the third part of his book.
One of the most original insights of this book is that while non-anthropocentric concerns can also serve to improve human life, the relatively brief history of environmental ethics has been marked by conflict between the individualistic concerns of animal welfare and rights approaches and the holistic concerns for protecting species and ecosystems. In the last two chapters of Part Two, Wenz covers the major perspectives and arguments for holistic non-anthropocentrism. The justification for protecting a species from extinction, either animal or plant, is holistic in the sense that it is the interdependence among them that has value in itself. Wenz explains why there are conflicts between animal welfare and rights theories and arguments in defense of species. For example, efforts to save an endangered species, like the komodo dragon that survives on a small island near Bali in Indonesia have included slaughtering goats to feed them fresh meat. In a separate chapter on justifications for preserving ecosystems, Wenz addresses what environmental ethicist, Baird Callicott, once termed the "triangular affair" or tension among the competing concerns of human welfare, animal welfare and rights, and ecosystem integrity. The case study that Wenz uses to illustrate this three-way relationship is the conflict over the African elephant: from an ecological perspective the culling of herds is necessary because herds can quickly overpopulate nature preserves, and because culling an entire herd is less likely to take out the strongest members of the herd than is trophy hunting; from an animal welfare or rights perspective any form of killing is wrong; and from a human perspective programs that authorize local people to grant hunting licenses develop economic self-sufficiency (163).
Environmental Synergy
It would seem that it is virtually impossible to reconcile perspectives that range along a continuum from strong anthropocentrism to strong non-anthropocentrism. If maintaining the integrity of a fragile ecosystem requires sacrificing other important interests, then political conflicts seem inevitable; however, Wenz spends the remainder of his book laying out the position that "Overall and in the long run, simultaneous respect for people and nature improves outcomes for both" (169.) His argument stems from the insight that human attempts to dominate nature end up oppressing people as well.
The gist of the book's thesis is that people are too ignorant to control nature in the human interest, however well-meaning those attempts may be. The Green Revolution is a case in point: Attempts to use agricultural technology to increase food production have led to mono-cultures which allow pests to multiply quickly, thus creating higher rates of crop loss despite ever-increasing amounts of insecticides. Moreover, mono-cultures of cash crops require artificial fertilizers that promote the growth of weeds, thus requiring greater use of herbicides. In the final analysis, mono-cultures of cash crops do not reduce poverty but rather are disastrous for local subsistence farmers (183.) Significantly, Wenz believes that we must value bio-diversity for itself in order to derive the maximum benefit for humans, not that we must first value bio-diversity because it is good for people.
The second chapter of Part Three focuses on the "master mentality" in Western thought, the tendency to classify reality into dichotomous groups and to assign values to opposing categories based on up-down thinking. The same mentality that subordinates "animal" to "human" also tends to subordinate women to men, racial minorities to racial majorities, as well as colonizers over indigenous people (190.) A synergy exists between valuing natural ecosystems for themselves and protecting vulnerable people, since they suffer disproportionately from the effects of pollution (201).
The environmental synergy that exists between respect for nature and vulnerable people is obviously not a synthesis between the anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric theories that Wenz reviews in the first two parts of his book. The various approaches that place human welfare above bio-diversity cannot easily reconcile human ethical concerns with respect for nature because they assume that the scientific management of nature is necessary for human progress. Conversely, most non-anthropocentric perspectives seek to protect nature from people and reject the possibility of benign stewardship of fragile ecosystems. In order to think synergistically about environmental ethics, one must first redefine what "human welfare" means, namely the sense of wellbeing that comes from limiting consumption (241.)
Living Synergistically: Making It Happen
The various examples of environmental synergy provided by Wenz suggest that only local indigenous tribes have successfully reconciled respect for their land communities with their own welfare, and they are able to live synergistically because their economies are not based on exports; on division of labor and specialization; or on consumption of goods and services. Does Wenz really think that such a reconciliation is possible in the U.S.? The remainder of the book is devoted to the changes that are required at both the individual and policy levels in order to achieve synergy between human values and respect for nature.
The arguments in the fourth and final part of the book boil down to two basic points. First, human well-being is enhanced by limiting consumption, and valuing nature for itself leads people to the paradoxical awareness that self-sacrifice on behalf of non-anthropocentric concerns results in a deeper sense of happiness than unreflective consumerism. The author points to Alasdaire MacIntyre's concept of a "practice" or socially created standard of excellence to support his argument that people who are motivated by intrinsic rewards, such as the sense of connection to an ongoing tradition, rather than the extrinsic rewards of a materialist life-style will be happier in the long run (250.) The main determinant of human happiness is a sense of inter-connectedness to one another and to nature (253.)
The second point is that most public policies are justified on the basis of their efficiency or cost-effectiveness, but their calculations are skewed. They fail to include the "hidden" social and environmental costs of many decisions. As Wenz points out, what is cheaper for the individual consumer may be destructive to society as a whole and to nature. He uses the example of commuting by car: individual employees may think it is cheaper to drive and park in free employer-provided parking spaces than take the train or bus; however, one of the reasons it appears cheaper is because employees do not pay taxes on this employer-provided benefit. In addition, employers can deduct their parking and maintenance costs from their tax liability. In short the tax structure encourages people to drive their cars to work because it makes automotive transportation seem more efficient, but in fact the public (and nature) as a whole end up absorbing the hidden costs (259.)
Conclusion
There is a certain logic to these arguments for environmental synergy, a logic that some have termed "ecological rationality" (Aiken, 1984 ) or "green reason" (Dryzek, 1995.) It seems to be compatible with emerging theories of public administration that are place-based or community-centered and that rely on active engagement by citizens who are motivated by the intrinsic value of being part of a human and a land community (Kemmis, 1990.) In that sense Environmental Ethics Today is not only accessible to public administrators but holds out hope for those searching for an "eco-centric" practice (Luton, 2001.)
While the pre-modern village may be the clearest example of living
synergistically, there are communities exemplifying civic engagement
(King, 1998) as well as civic environmentalism (John, 1994.) The
historical association between "nature" and wilderness in the U.S.
has tended to create a form of dichotomous thinking - society versus
wilderness, nature versus culture, and human versus animal. Yet,
as Borgmann (1992) has argued, domesticated nature is full of eloquent
things that have "commanding presence, continuity with the world,
and centering power" (120.) Wenz's almost exclusive emphasis on
pre-modern villages might leave readers with the mistaken impression
that environmental ethics, even an approach that seeks to reconcile
human welfare and respect for nature, is beyond the reach of most
modern nations. In the end it is this preoccupation with indigenous
peoples and subsistence economies that is the major weakness of
the book. Most readers will not identify with pre-modern communities,
and most public administrators will have trouble visualizing how
to redirect theory and practice if they leave the book with the
impression that subsistence farming is the paradigmatic example
of environmental synergism. The challenge of designing an eco-centric
public administration is daunting enough, and we need inspiration
that is closer to home.