| Review of: | Morality and Nationalism by Catherine Frost |
|---|---|
| Reviewed By: | Paul Gilbert |
| Reviewed in: | Political Studies Review |
| Date accepted online: | 14/01/2008 |
| Published in print: | Volume 05, Issue 03, Pages 395-474 |
Book Reviews: Political Theory
This book addresses the disconcertingly general question: what is the moral worth of nations? After considering some contemporary answers, both favourable and unfavourable, Frost discusses the history of two nationalisms - Irish and Québecois - and suggests that each of them pursues a course ranging from emphasising the need for independent government to focusing on the creation of a national character. Frost rejects the view that this involves a shift from civic to ethnic nationalism.
Instead, a national character was needed to give a group the cohesiveness required for self-government and the distinctiveness necessary for setting the boundaries of its polity. We should, she suggests, see 'nations as frames of reference' (p. 97) which their members share, facilitating the communication and mutual trust needed for representation. Therein lies their moral worth, so long as this framework is flexible and inclusive. Frost looks again at Ireland and Quebec to see how her theory can be applied, especially in the light of social change to which, she implies, their nationalisms have adapted quite well.
Besides mounting this argument, Frost discusses most of the current philosophical defences of nationalism, presenting her own account as capturing their insights while avoiding their mistakes - in particular, the bifurcation of the political from the cultural. Thus, though perhaps aimed principally at fellow workers in this increasingly crowded field, the book could serve as a useful introduction to readers new to it, but not, I would judge, at undergraduate level. It is, however, well organised and clearly written, its Irish and Québecois case studies leavening its potentially stodgy political theory.
However, emphasis on just these two cases is a danger that political scientists may exploit. While it is not clear that Frost is offering an empirical account susceptible to counter-example rather than an illuminating model of the way the political and cultural aspects of nationalism fit together, it is still unconvincingly general in view of the huge diversity of nationalisms. It is also worryingly vague, for what exactly a 'frame of reference' is and how it relates to 'national character' are not made sufficiently clear, it seems to me, to judge Frost's claim that these are needed for well-functioning political communities and, hence, that nations are morally worthy. Despite these doubts, this is a valuable addition to the philosophical literature on nationalism.