| Review of: | US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: global hegemon or reluctant sheriff? by Fraser Cameron The Dynamics of Coercion: American foreign policy and the limits of military might by Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman |
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| Reviewed By: | John Dumbrell |
| Reviewed in: | Political Studies Review |
| Date accepted online: | 04/03/2004 |
| Published in print: | Volume 1, Issue 2, Pages 196-301 |
North America
Fraser Cameron's study of contemporary US foreign policy-making is a very lively and well-informed guide to the dynamics and procedures of American foreign relations in the post-Soviet era. Especially if used in conjunction with a more historically oriented text, this book will be of great benefit, particularly to first-year students, but also to specialists wishing to gain an overview of institutional and contextual changes since 1990. Some quintessentially Cold War institutions, notably the Central Intelligence Agency, are accorded rather short shrift. The book is particularly strong on trade and globalization. Inevitably, the onset of the 'war on terrorism' as the chief US priority creates some difficulties of interpretation and organization for the author. However, this is an extremely impressive and accessible account of the various debates surrounding the organization and use of contemporary American international power.
Cameron makes some perceptive comments about the various modes of American international power projection. For example, 'unilateralists' are helpfully divided into those who wish to see the USA achieving a retrenched and limited global balancing role, and those (like the senior 'hawks' in the current Bush administration) who see security cooperation as an obstacle to the assertion and preservation of American interests. The study by Byman and Waxman takes these debates much further. The central concern here is with modes of American military power projection in a world of borderless threats, asymmetric conflict and without a 'peer competitor'. The authors, whose book appears under the auspices of the RAND Corporation, distinguish 'coercive mechanisms' from 'coercive instruments'. The former encompass various strategies for tackling asymmetric threats from 'rogue states': power base erosion (where the USA will attempt to facilitate the disaffection of key regime supporters); unrest (involving encouragement of popular protest); decapitation (assassination or removal of the 'rogue' head of state); weakening (achieving national destabilization); and denial (preventing a military or political victory by the enemy). 'Coercive instruments' relate mainly to air power, but also encompass invasion, various levels of threat, sanctions and support for insurgency. The discussion is intelligent and draws on recent experiences in the Balkans and the Middle East. However, three features of the discussion particularly strike this reviewer. First, it is not always clear how these various arguments about coercion affect non-state actors, notably aI-Qaeda. Non-state actors are discussed mainly in the context of humanitarian rather than anti-terrorist intervention. Second, the book is resolutely geared towards 'American interests' in a relatively narrow sense. There is no obvious presumption in favour of the claims of international law and multilateralism. Lastly, the authors, very wisely, emphasize that things have a habit of going wrong and that unintended consequences are almost inevitable. Clear thinking, they would no doubt respond, can minimize damaging and unintended consequences. So perhaps can caution. At one point, Byman and Waxman (p. 85) write: 'What worked against Iraq in 1993 may fail against Serbia in 2001, or even against Iraq in 2001'. Quite.