Book Reviews
The premise of the text, that war can be waged without death, is poorly argued. Though a worthy goal, many deem it absurd. Morehouse, a former officer in the U.S. Army, argues that nonlethal weaponry is as highly revolutionary as atomic weapons and must be incorporated into political dialogue and military doctrine in order to prevent the fall of humankind. The defense industry, according to Morehouse, bears the brunt of blame for causing widespread destruction and preventing full-scale implementation of non-lethal weaponry. Unfortunately, people have been killing each other for thousands of years with technology as primitive as rocks and sticks, and it is difficult to imagine that this would somehow cease upon the introduction of nonlethal weapons.
This is not to say that nonlethal weapons do not have a proper place in our military arsenals. However, his arguments can be made with a stronger presentation, with more balance, and by addressing pertinent issues and questions, not by only giving hypothetical scenarios.
In the first part of the book, Morehouse defines nonlethal weaponry and begins to expound on the impact that this type of warfare will have on the status quo. Disturbingly, he takes it upon himself to reveal classified information, arguing that there are some secrets worth revealing. The validity of the argument weakens when in note 11 of chapter 6 he reveals his source as someone who is not affiliated with the project he is discussing, yet knows enough about it to disclose important information. Classified projects are highly compartmentalized, releasing information to people only on a “need to know” basis. Any information the source may have obtained is clearly second- or third-hand and passed on after yet another violation of security procedures. I do not wish to defend or criticize current security policies, but state that the source does not have first-hand information.
The middle portion of the book is a regurgitation of military and security strategy, offering precious little new information. The author claims that “it provides a simple explanation for why nations build weapons and forces ...” and that it “examines the theory that there is a linkage among strategic setting, national security strategy, national military strategy, and the kinds of weapons and forces that a nation develops” (4). These linkages seem to be practically self-evident connections that any student of history could make.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 provide some historical context, but barely mention nonlethal technologies. Nevertheless these chapters comprise a substantial portion of the book. Instead of rehashing common knowledge, the space would be better used describing nonlethal weapons in those scenarios. What is the nonlethal response to a large-scale surprise attack, such as Pearl Harbor? To a terrorist attack like that of the Pan Am bombings over Lockerbie, Scotland? Can you respond nonlethally when someone’s knife is at your throat? How is the public going to respond to an attack where the lives of their countrymen are taken? These are the sort of questions that could be addressed by the author. Morehouse’s vision chapter describes hypothetical scenarios using nonlethal weapons, some that are readily available, some that are currently proposed, but most have major flaws. Most of his proposed biotechnologies may be in direct violation of Article 1 of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, of which the United States and most world powers are signatories. The scenarios describing superpolymers and shroud rounds are pure speculation, passed off as emerging technologies. Delivery of genetically engineered contaminants presents major difficulties. An enemy would surely respond lethally as it observes guerillas transporting nonlethal agents to a target, causing a near-certain escalation of hostilities. It is also absurd to think that a high-flying drone could “paint ball” a satellite in orbit around the earth. Some of what Morehouse presents, including defoliants, incapacitating agents, attacks on infrastructure, and information warfare, are already in use by the military. A discussion of how nonlethal weaponry fits into overall defense doctrine makes a stronger case than a mere presentation of scenarios.
Beyond the context of the book, there are a number of typographical errors, some bordering on humorous (see page 95), which detract from the main ideas. This lends an aura of amateurism to the tome.
The author states that “credible military power is vital both to the deterrence and, fundamentally, to the interests and commitments of a world power” (61). Would other nations consider a country with only nonlethal weapons as a credible power? I think not. Only the threat of deadly force, or the use thereof, will stop a determined aggressor. Would gluing the Revolutionary Guard to their tanks have prevented Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait? Nonlethal weapons deserve increased research funding, and it is worthwhile to study their place in overall military doctrine, but I can’t envision many military commanders shaking in their boots when faced with the prospect of confronting only these types of weapons.
