Héritier then derives some propositions from bargaining theory and organization theory respectively regarding how decisional deadlocks might be transcended. According to bargaining theory, stalemates may be avoided by, for instance, striking package deals, offering compensation payments and reaching compromises. From organization theory she borrows Nils Brunsson’s idea of hypocrisy according to which deadlocks are circumvented by ‘talk’ and symbolic action. Policy innovation is facilitated by insulating experts from their political masters.

Based on her own empirical research, and on secondary analyses, Héritier then discusses the role of subterfuge in various policy arenas, arenas that are somewhat akin to Theodore Lowi’s typology: market-making policy (transport and telecommunications), the provision of collective goods and the reduction of externalities (environmental policy), market-correcting, redistributive policy (regional and social policy) and market-correcting, distributive policy (research and technology). The main result of the empirical work is that policy processes in all the sectors covered might have come to a halt had it not been for the available ‘escape routes’; package deals, shifts of arenas (e.g. from the Council to the Court), alternative procedures (e.g. QMR vs. tripartite corporatist deals); external events, ‘talk’ separated from action, expertise insulation, etc. Thus, the underlying theories offer complementary answers. ‘Where the stakes are clear and the problem is easy to understand, bargaining theory covering all forms of compromises is arguably more appropriate’ (p. 91). Given the opposite situation, the separation of talk and action emphasized by Brunsson may be better in order to explain subterfuge. However, no clear relationship between type of policy and the use of escape routes emerged from the data.

By mainly drawing on Brunsson’s work on hypocrisy, the author has been extremely selective concerning the role that organization theory might play in her efforts to account for how deadlocks might be avoided. In my view there are several far more obvious expectations that could be derived from an organizational perspective. For example, one would assume that national decision makers who interact routinely and extensively with other nationals and EU representatives within organizational settings like working parties and ministerial meetings will become affected to some extent. As participants in multi-level structures, they become exposed to additional obligations, agendas, problems, solutions, incentives and sanctions. It follows that interest diversity may become modified, that common solutions might be discovered, and that deadlock situations probably will occur less frequently. The organizational resources available at the supranational level could be crucial as regards the extent to which collective agendas and alternatives can be developed and substantiated. And finally, a complex and loosely coupled system like the EU may be highly conducive to policy innovation. From an organizational point of view this feature of the EU is probably much more important than the insulation of experts from political control.

Adrienne Héritier has a lot to say about the pivotal role played by institutions like the Commission and the Court in various policy arenas. May be several readers will miss an explicit discussion on the intergovernmentalism/institutionalism issue which is so high on the research agenda (as well as on the political agenda). Within the chosen frame, however, Adrienne Héritier has written a tightly woven book which is analytically stringent and empirically rich.