| Review of: | Between Two Unions: Europeanisation and Scottish Devolution by Paolo Dardanelli |
|---|---|
| Reviewed By: | Nicola McEwen |
| Reviewed in: | Nations and Nationalism |
| Date accepted online: | 02/11/2007 |
| Published in print: | Volume 13, Issue 2, Pages 341-367 |
Book Reviews
The rise of sub-state nationalism in advanced European democracies over the last forty years has been paralleled by a process of European integration. The nationalism literature often assumes that these processes are interlinked, with the economic and political security provided by the European Union making enhanced sub-state autonomy or even secession from the state a less daunting prospect for Europe's national minorities. Yet, as Dardanelli points out, this assumption has largely avoided empirical scrutiny. He seeks to address this gap in the literature by taking up the case of Scotland. The central question addressed in his book is whether the process of European integration generated or increased demands for Scottish self-government, ultimately leading to the successful referendum endorsing Scottish devolution in 1997. This is tested by conducting a comparative analysis of elite discourse and public opinion in the two devolution referendums of 1979 and 1997, with the expectation that deepening European integration in the intervening years would have resulted in the Europeanisation of the politics of Scottish self-government and, in turn, increased support for a Yes vote in the devolution referendum.
For Dardanelli, the effect of 'Europeanisation' is measured, first, by the extent to which political elites perceive the EU as providing incentives for, and reducing the costs of, regional self-government, and second, where this effect is used by them to reshape the distribution of public preferences. As may be expected, Dardanelli finds little evidence of Europeanisation in the devolution debates of the 1970s. For the most part, the parties and interest groups campaigning for Scottish home rule were opposed to Britain's membership of the European Community, and the process of European integration played no part in their case for Scottish self-government. Among the interest groups examined, only the Church of Scotland combined its support for Scottish self-government with support for European integration, arguing in particular that the establishment of a Scottish assembly was necessary to ensure Scotland could be adequately represented at the European level. Those most favourable to the European Community in this period, the Conservative Party and business groups, were most hostile to Scottish self-government, but the EU dimension was largely seen as irrelevant to the Scottish constitutional debate. The devolution debates of the 1970s culminated in the 1979 referendum, which resulted in a narrow but insufficient majority in favour of the government's proposed devolution scheme. According to Dardanelli, the failure of the pro-home rule groups to Europeanise 'loomed large in the ultimate defeat of devolution in the 1970s', not least because it prevented them from allaying fears about the likelihood that devolution might lead to independence. But those opposed to the European project were hardly likely to perceive it as offering incentives and opportunities for regional self-government. Moreover, if their failure to Europeanise had an effect on the lack of support for a Yes vote in the referendum, it is a rather indirect one, the direct effect being the fear of independence.
The years between the first and second devolution referendum saw a transformation in elite and public attitudes towards European integration. Most notably, the Scottish National Party, the Labour Party and the Scottish Trades Union Congress - key players in the movement for Scottish self-government - became positively enthusiastic about the European project, and their enthusiasm was reflected in the discourse of the Scottish Constitutional Convention. Dardanelli presents substantial evidence of the ways in which the key players sought to use the European Union to legitimise their policies on Scottish self-government. In advocating 'Independence in Europe', the SNP saw the prospect of Scotland's independent membership of the European Union as presenting an opportunity to reduce the symbolic and economic costs of secession, and to make its independence objective a mainstream goal which would put Scotland on a par with other 'normal' small European nations. The SNP's exploitation of the European Union forced other parties to present their arguments for and against self-government within a European framework. For the pro-devolutionists, Scottish devolution was in keeping with European-wide trends towards regionalisation and the then fashionable idea of a 'Europe of the Regions', and a Scottish Parliament within the UK provided the best means of representing Scottish interests in Europe. The Conservative Party, by then hostile to devolution and deepening European integration, argued that the establishment of a Scottish Parliament would weaken the UK and weaken Scotland's representation in the EU.
Dardanelli makes a convincing case that the EU came to be seen by political elites as a facilitator of Scottish self-government, offering incentives and opportunities to those advocating independence and devolution, and providing an element of unity on the pro-devolution side of the referendum campaign. Less convincing is his claim that 'the exploitation of the European dimension was the single most important factor accounting for the endorsement of devolution'. Certainly, the prospect of 'Independence in the European Union' became the second most popular constitutional option, and the second preference of those most favourable to devolution. As in 1979, voters considered it likely that devolution would lead to independence, but unlike in 1997, this was a less fearful prospect and thus no longer a deterrent to their support for a Scottish Parliament. Whether or not this was a direct consequence of the SNP's conversion to the European integration process is more difficult to determine. Public opinion was certainly more favourable towards the EU in 1997, but Dardanelli's analysis of the referendum vote indicates that attitudes towards the EU had no bearing on respondents' likelihood to vote in favour of devolution.
Dardanelli is rather too ready to dismiss the prevailing explanations offered within the existing literature, in particular, the view that increased support for Scottish self-government was a result of a perceived 'democratic deficit' in the UK political system. Between 1979 and 1997, Scots were ruled by a Conservative government in spite of consistently rejecting the Conservative Party in successive General Elections. A prevalent argument in the literature suggests that this de-legitimised the UK's constitutional framework and fuelled support for greater self-government. Drawing upon an analysis of a referendum survey, Dardanelli suggests that for the 'democratic deficit' thesis to be upheld, it ought to have led to four outcomes: a decline in satisfaction with the UK government among non-Conservative identifiers; dissatisfaction with the UK government being a stronger determinant of the demand for self-government in 1997 than in 1979; a higher importance of self-government as a political issue; and increased support for devolution as a constitutional option. The absence of evidence in support of these phenomena is used to reject the thesis that a perceived democratic deficit in the system generated increased support for devolution. The problem with this analysis is that the measures of satisfaction with, and trust in, government are taken in the aftermath of the 1997 devolution referendum, when the government in question was a Labour government, not a Conservative government. Other variables measuring attitudes towards the Conservative Party reveal a stronger correlation between anti-Conservative attitudes and support for self-government. Furthermore, a decline in the perceived legitimacy of the UK political system over the 18 years of Conservative rule may have helped increase support for independence as much as the changed European context in which these debates took place. It seems unlikely that the persistent rejection of the party of government by Scottish electors did not have at least an indirect effect on support for Scottish self-government. The Labour Party's failure to win a British General Election for 18 years certainly reinforced its support for devolution and the 1987-1992 period in particular - the period identified by Dardanelli as producing the strongest links between Europeanisation and support for self-government - saw Labour use the language of nationalism in articulating its demand for devolution.
Nonetheless, by focusing on the impact of European integration on the politics of regional self-government, Dardanelli provides an insightful analysis of a phenomenon given only cursory attention within the existing literature. His book is well written, well structured, and provides an empirically rich account which may help to illustrate not only the role played by the EU in framing and advancing Scottish self-government demands, but may also shed light on the impact of European integration on the politics of sub-state nationalism and regionalism throughout the Union.