| Review of: | Delegation and Agency in International Organizations edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney |
|---|---|
| Reviewed By: | Christopher S. Marcoux |
| Reviewed in: | International Studies Review |
| Date accepted online: | 10/04/2008 |
| Published in print: | Volume 09, Issue 02, Pages 262-264 |
Autonomous Actors or Faithful Agents?
Darren Hawkins, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney open
To gain leverage over these questions, Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, Tierney and their contributors turn to principal-agent theory, arguing that it is equally relevant for international relations as it is for domestic politics. Given that principal-agent theory has been less prominent in international relations than in the study of US politics, the volume's most immediate contribution may lie in the Introduction's comprehensive and clear elaboration of the principal-agent framework. Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney explain that "to be a principal, an actor must be able to both grant authority and rescind it" (p. 7). Furthermore, delegation involves "a conditional grant of authority from a
Having defined these concepts, Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney proceed to outline the two primary goals of the book: (1) to explain why states delegate authority to international organizations, accounting for variation in delegation, and (2) to explain how principals attempt to control agents, and how agents sometimes obtain significant autonomy. "By delegating, states reap gains from specialization, as well as capture policy externalities, facilitate collective decision-making, resolve disputes, enhance credibility, and lock-in policy biases" (p. 23). In contrast, delegation is hampered by preference heterogeneity (among principals) and asymmetry between state power and organizational decision rules. With respect to the second goal, principals' attempt to control agents by (1) emphasizing specific rules and minimizing discretion, (2) monitoring agent behavior, (3) carefully selecting agents with desired preferences, (4) creating checks and balances among agents, and (5) using sanctions.
The bulk of
In Part 3, Alexander Thompson (Chapter 8) points out that agent characteristics can also influence the informational function of an international organization. Specifically, the heterogeneous preference structure of the UN Security Council permits it to serve as a reliable signal of the legitimacy of a potential use of force. Another common theme, noted particularly by Hawkins and Wade Jacoby (Chapter 7) and Martin, is that a higher congruence between the interests of agents and principals is likely to lead to greater levels of delegation. The nature of delegated tasks also influences the level of delegation. Karen Alter (Chapter 11) notes a variety of reasons why the behavior of international courts is difficult to control. Similarly, Erica Gould (Chapter 10) points to a number of reasons why the International Monetary Fund is a "particularly costly agent" (p. 304) for principals to monitor effectively, and Hawkins and Jacoby sketch a number of strategies available to agents to increase their autonomy.
The chapters, individually and collectively, make a substantial contribution to scholarship on international organizations, demonstrating the promise of principal-agent theory. In the Conclusion, Lake and Mathew McCubbins reach beyond these contributions to explore the "research frontier" of principal-agent approaches in the study of international organizations. Specifically, they examine the use of third parties as a potential mechanism for strengthening principals' control over such organizations. Even though they are no doubt correct when they assert that exploring the role of third parties will be a productive avenue for future research, Lake and McCubbins' claim that the study of principals' use of third parties to reassert control over international organizations will be "central to future research" (p. 347) will doubtless leave some readers frustrated.
This conclusion deviates from the original focus of
Increasing the accountability of international organizations to member states represents one critical avenue for future research, but it is only one avenue. The commitment to international organizations as actors, advanced at the outset of the volume, suggests that the principal-agent framework may be potentially useful for examining a broader range of concerns, such as organizational change. Additionally, it opens the possibility that international organizations may exert reciprocal influence on state interests. In Milner's study, domestic public opinion shapes states' choices regarding whether to provide foreign aid unilaterally or multilaterally. Yet, it is also plausible that international organizations influence domestic public opinion regarding the value of "humanitarian," as opposed to targeted, aid. Similarly, Alter describes "legitimacy politics" (p. 336) as a strategy by which international organizations may influence principals. Finally, Mark Pollack (Chapter 6) finds evidence for social learning in that delegation to the European Union influenced other states' decisions to delegate to international organizations. Thus, perhaps the greatest contribution of the volume may be to create space for a genuine dialogue between sociological and rationalist approaches to explaining specific empirical puzzles of international organizations.