We can distinguish in the democratic discourse two schools of thought that give different answers to that question. Republican and institutionalist views confront each other. According to the republican school, it is we—the people—who matter. Active citizenship makes democracy work. Control of the state is exerted from the outside—by a politically resourceful and democratically committed citizenry. The institutionalist view, by contrast, emphasizes constraints operating inside the state apparatus. The quality of democracy—and the way the state functions—are contingent upon the effectiveness of internal restraints—i.e., systems of checks and balances—involving organs of judicial and administrative scrutiny.

Shmuel N. Eisenstadt’s book starts with an ample portrayal of these basic views of democratic governance. On the republican side, he distinguishes a liberal and a communitarian camp. The liberals are in favor of a relatively small state. On the other hand, they presume a fairly harmonious interaction between state and society. The communitarian school is more negative toward the existing state, but, at the same time, it tends to demand much more from the state through distributional policies. In Eisenstadt’s understanding, the institutionalist view is linked particularly to the work of Joseph Schumpeter. If we restrict ourselves to the way elections are carried out, this is true. The institutionalist view has a wider focus and is thus tied to ever-greater names. The grand champions of the institutionalist argument are James Madison (constitutionalist) and Max Weber (administrative).

In the remainder of the book, Eisenstadt undertakes a broad and very learned exposition of the historical development of these democratic discourses. His approach is cultural and comparative. What he has written in fact are short essays, in which he discusses different notions of modernity, new social movements, and the effects of globalization. It is all interesting and enjoyable, but the arguments are somewhat sweeping and not always original.

The book edited by Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner is organized within an analytical framework advanced by Guillermo O’Donnell. Schedler finds that democratic control in many developing countries (especially in Latin America) is limited in two ways. Effective influence from the citizenry (“vertical control”) is lacking. At the same time, internal checks and balances (“horizontal control”) are very weak. Consequently, power is concentrated largely at the top of the system in the central executive, the presidency. This mode of “delegative democracy” is normally associated with extensive abuse of power, as the yield for society at large is generally very meager.

In his contribution to the book, as do the other authors, Guillermo O’Donnell concentrates on the horizontal aspect of things. In other words, this is a book that links to the institutionalist tradition; it is about internal constraints of the state apparatus, about the way the organs in question are operating, and about attempts at reform. Four areas—electoral administration, the judicial system, corruption control, and central banks—are dealt with in different sections. Overall, the articles are very instructive. Particularly worthy of attention are the studies of judicial reform in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe by Pilar Domingo, Jennifer Widner, and Herman Schwartz.

In many instances, a serious weakness of judicial authorities is the low opinion of legitimacy among the general public. In countries such as Argentina and Peru, some 70 percent of the citizens distrust the judiciary (conversely, in countries like Germany and the United States, judicial organs are among the most trusted). Why is this? Simply because they get the support they deserve. In many Latin American countries, the judiciary is renowned for its ineffectiveness, corrupt practices, and receptivity to political pressure—and for these reasons it is not trusted. Therefore, it is easy to wear the judiciary down when—occasionally—it tries to stand up to the powers that be. To function as effective tools of counterbalance, institutions must be backed by active support from society. It is basically this support that gives them political muscle. Given the circumstances—low institutional performance and a politically weak and alienated citizenry—such support is not easily achieved.

This dilemma leads us to conclude that the two programs for democratic control—the institutionalist and the republican—must be combined. Development of active political citizenship requires supportive institutional structures, involving an effective judiciary that can safeguard essential democratic rights. But to be put in place and thereafter to function properly, such institutions also need active popular backing. So what comes first—the chicken or the egg? How could a process of reform begin?

In the book’s concluding chapter, Schedler reflects on this problem. He distinguishes four sources of reform—initiatives from above, from within (the bureaucracy), from below, and from outside (the international community)—and outlines the potentials and limitations of each approach. It is still just a sketch. Nevertheless, it is interesting and certainly worth reading, which also holds for the rest of the book as a whole.