Interestingly, the book in the end is less about how these major powers shaped the world than about how geography and history have shaped them. Pastor argues in his chapter on the United States that “the world today is different because the United States is different” (p. 238). Actually, the authors demonstrate that each of the magnificent seven is different. It just so happens that since the United States is the most powerful, its difference is more important to understanding the system as a whole.

The book’s strength is that of an edited book: the chapters complement one another well, with each author writing about geography, culture, and history. But the editor and the authors miss a valuable chance to discuss different political systems and their effects. Why does a particular political or economic system seem well or ill suited to a given era? This subject is critical for thinking about current Russian and Chinese weakness, British adaptability, American prosperity, and Japanese stagnation.

For those scholars worried about the impact of globalization on the way we think and teach about international relations, Pastor and his colleagues provide a vigorous defense of the status quo: “We believe that states—and, in particular England, France, Germany, Russia, the United States, Japan and China—have been the principal actors on the international stage throughout this century and that they are likely to remain so as far as we can see into the next century” (vii). The traditional measures of military and economic strength, territory, and population define the who’s who. And the state is not withering away in the face of new economic forces: “In relation to the size of its economy, the state in the richer countries is twice as large and growing faster than in the poorer countries .... Globalization might be shrinking the world, but governments are growing bigger, and they are responding to a wider array of popular needs” (p. 9).

Yet Pastor argues that a great power “by definition exercises an important influence around the world” (p. 25). By that definition, do China and Russia really count today? By that definition, Saudi Arabia (as well as Microsoft) should be on the list. With France, Britain, and Germany only great as part of a larger entity, and with Japan stuck, that leaves just the United States. Maybe some of the action is elsewhere?

In steps Rosecrance. The author who described for us in the 1980s the rise of a new type of trading state, distinct from the traditional military state, now brings us “head” and “body” nations. If the twentieth-century world of Pastor and his colleagues demonstrated the importance of location, location, location, the twenty-first-century world in Rosecrance’s depiction is all about brains versus brawn. The virtual states have a huge proportion of Gross Domestic Product in their service sector (according to Rosecrance, for the United States, 70 percent of GDP is in services, with only 18 percent left in manufacturing).

Rosecrance remains unabashedly liberal, believing that more economic inter-dependence leads to greater peace:

The whole trend of international politics in the past half century moves against the notion of perpetual conflict. The zone of peace and economic growth is increasing. The zone of war and internal conflict imposes economic stasis and retrogression on its members. Conflict as usual will continue in retrograde portions of international society, but it will increasingly be eliminated among advanced countries (p. 82).

Both books are optimistic on this score, but Rosecrance explains why. Pastor’s emphasis on geography provides little basis for understanding why the future should be different. Rosecrance, a technological determinist, has a ready answer.

Rosecrance also tells us that to succeed in the new world requires that the virtual state produce “a partnership between politics and economics operating in both domestic and international realms” (p. 22). People still need a state but, like Thomas Friedman, Rosecrance argues that they need the right kind of state.

Yet the reader is left wondering about this brave new world. We still need material goods to live. And while for now the “head” nations locate their production facilities abroad in the “body” nations, what state will be content to stay in manufacturing? If everybody tries to emulate the rich by moving into services, who will be left to make things?

If Pastor leaves us wondering if the future will really resemble the past, Rosecrance seems to attribute too much to economic rationality. History suggests otherwise. “China,” writes Rosecrance, “is unlikely to revive past territorial demands” (p. 172). Are we to forget Taiwan?

Are we really on autopilot in a world in which economic interests will trump everything else? In fact, Rosecrance recognizes that major states need to agree on fundamentals to keep this system operating smoothly. Although this extremely well-written book provides us with a good starting point for analysis of the changes in world affairs, it does not offer prescriptions for how to make a particular outcome more or less likely.

With one book making the case for seven great powers and the other for the new “virtual” states, we might forget just how dependent the current international system is on continued U.S. domination of security affairs. Pastor writes that the system is stable because the “principal challengers believe they have more at stake in preserving the system than in toppling it” (p. 345). Perhaps that is because they do not believe they can topple it. A reader can be forgiven for having the uneasy feeling that much hard work by the United States and its allies will be necessary to maintain an international system that continues to grow more prosperous.