| Review of: | Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union by J. Tallberg |
|---|---|
| Reviewed By: | Jackie Gower |
| Reviewed in: | Journal of Common Market Studies |
| Date accepted online: | 02/11/2007 |
| Published in print: | Volume 45, Issue 2, Pages 515-533 |
Book Reviews
Negotiation and bargaining clearly lie at the heart of EU politics and yet the importance of the role played by the chair in influencing the outcome has received surprisingly little academic attention. Jonas Tallberg seeks to fill this gap in the literature by developing a theory of formal leadership that synthesizes elements of rational choice institutionalism and general bargaining theory and testing it by reference to the role of the Council Presidency.
His core argument is that Member States have chosen to delegate the key functions of agenda management, brokerage and representation to the Presidency in order to overcome the problems inherent in multilateral negotiations and to increase the likelihood of successful outcomes. This functionalist interpretation is then applied to a detailed account of the historical development of the Presidency from 'an insignificant administrative office' in the 1950s to the 'powerful political platform' of today (p. 43), arguing that the driving force has been the search for more efficient modes of co-operation. Subsequent chapters explore the consequences of empowering the institution of the chair, specifically in relation to the Presidency's role as agenda manager (shaping political priorities), broker (constructing intergovernmental bargains) and representative (negotiating with third parties). The empirical evidence is drawn from six case studies of negotiations undertaken during the German, Finnish, French, Swedish and Danish Presidencies 1999-2002 (the car-recycling directive, the Northern Dimension, Agenda 2000, the IGC 2000, transparency rules and EU enlargement). Many of these have been the subject of previous studies and Tallberg draws extensively from the existing literature to support his argument. However, this is not to detract from the originality and significance of his analysis, which deliberately eschews the usual focus on evaluating the performance of a specific state holding the Presidency and instead seeks to test his theory of formal leadership with respect to the office itself.
Tallberg's conclusion is that not only can the chair play a crucial role in ensuring the successful conclusion of multilateral negotiations but also its strategic position in the process offers opportunities for shaping the outcome in its own state's interest. Evidence from the case studies suggests that this is true for all states, irrespective of their relative size, and is directly related to the resources available to the Presidency, especially its privileged access to information and control over procedures. Interestingly, he argues that the institutional design of the office with its six-monthly rotation principle is crucial to making this acceptable to other Member States and offers some interesting and timely thoughts on the implications of the changes to the Presidency envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty.
Although theoretically rigorous, the argument is clearly developed and richly supported by empirical examples, which make it accessible to both a practitioner and academic readership. It is an important and stimulating book for all those interested in understanding the nature and exercise of formal leadership in international negotiations.