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Book Reviews How does membership of the European Union and the European Economic Area affect national decision-making in parliamentary democracies? This book seeks to answer the question by focusing on the effects of membership on the chain of delegation and accountability in the Nordic countries. The authors’ shared theoretical starting point is a principal–agent perspective. Accordingly they investigate the change and continuity in four principal–agent relationships: voters as principals and MPs as agents, parliament as principal and cabinet as agent, cabinet as principal and individual ministers as agents and cabinet/ministers as principals and civil servants as agents. The main thesis of the book is that ‘the transfer of power from the national level to the supranational does not necessarily mean that delegation fails or that there is a reduction in accountability at the national level’ (p. 2). This thesis is largely corroborated by the case studies. While this is not surprising due to the very broad nature of the thesis, the case studies are highly informative and help to explain exactly how parliaments have largely succeeded in maintaining control over cabinets through institutional innovation. The most important innovation is the European Affairs Committees for consultations and agreements with the cabinets in the three Nordic EU Member States. In general this is a well edited volume and, due to the common theoretical starting point, each of the empirical chapters follows largely the same structure. However, there is only a weak link between the more specific theoretical framework for understanding how the EU and EEA affect delegation and accountability in the Member States presented by Arthur Lupia in the second chapter of the book and the ensuing case studies. They are information packed, but largely atheoretical and their structure is only loosely based on Lupia’s model. Most importantly, whereas the model’s focus is mainly on the effect of EU membership on the outcome of the chain of delegation, the case studies are primarily concerned with how membership affects the process by which principals control agents. The individual case studies present only scattered and rather impressionistic reflections on the theoretical implications of the empirical analysis. However, in the concluding chapter, Erik Damgaard outlines a number of comparative and theoretical implications of the analyses. One interesting theoretical conclusion is that the inclusion of civil servants and interest groups in the making and implementation of EU policy in the Nordic countries may soon lead to a revival of the ‘corporatist’ perspective on Nordic policy-making. In conclusion, this is a clearly written and informative volume which will be of particular interest to those seeking an introduction to the influence of the European Union on Nordic decision-making processes.
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