A ‘comitology problem’ is acknowledged, with its attendant democratic deficit, poor transparency (although there have been recent reforms in this respect) and lack of accountability. The focus on social regulation allows the editors to take issue with the market correction view of social regulation. As put forward by Majone, such executive management of social regulation is portrayed as an essentially technocratic and depolitical approach. The editors and several authors effectively reject the notion of technocratic governance as anything other than highly political. Nonetheless, the editors, adopting an essentially functionalist approach, see the comitology system as a relative success in maintaining a necessary intergovernmental equilibrium, and some legitimacy, in EU decision-making. An alternative institutional model, that of European agencies, is explored and depicted as highly circumscribed, a useful template for assessing reform proposals for new European agencies (such as a European Food Agency).

The extent of executive authority offered through European legislation to the standing committees is highlighted in the chapter on the regulation of biotechnology. This is seen correctly as the derogation of political authority to the relevant standing committee. However, such a case study would be enhanced by a more detailed look at the policy consequences of this derogation, and the weaknesses of the technical provisions of the relevant directive, particularly in terms of the potential impacts of the decisions upon Europe’s environment and its biodiversity. In short, the devil is in the technical detail and the technical detail is political.

The decision-making in these regulatory arenas has far-reaching consequences for the safety and health of Europe’s environment and its citizens. If only for pointing the reader to these conclusions, this excellent collection is to be welcomed.