| Review of: | Twenty-First Century Peace Operations edited by William J. Durch |
|---|---|
| Reviewed By: | Maarten van Voorst Tot Voorst |
| Reviewed in: | Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management |
| Date accepted online: | 10/04/2008 |
| Published in print: | Volume 15, Issue 04, Pages 232-238 |
Book Reviews
Throughout the second half of the 20th century, a growing number of violent conflicts has resulted not in clear-cut victories for one of the involved parties but were halted by a deadlock or, more interestingly so, by outside intervention. Peace support operations (PSOs) have proven to be more than merely 'very low intensity conflict with "hearts and minds" annex'. Especially in civil conflicts prolonged by the presence of numerous spoilers, intervening actors are often struggling to reconcile legitimacy, cost, scope and effectiveness of their actions, in both the military and the civil sphere. These conceptualization difficulties were accompanied by several setbacks and disasters on the ground, notably the failure of UN-led missions to avert the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995.
Published in a collaborative effort between the Henry L. Stimson Center for Peace and the United States Institute of Peace Press, the present casebook - the third volume in a series on the subject - attempts to evaluate in a little over 650 pages the 'third surge', that is the period between 1999 and 2001 in which most of the discussed PSOs were launched by international organizations such as the UN and NATO.
The opening chapter (by Durch and Berkman) features the post-Cold War evolution of peace operations and an enlightening review of all the definitional problems surrounding peace operations.
As an annex to this chapter, a very solid estimation of the costs of such endeavours is included. This highly relevant topic probably deserves a publication in its own right, and it is, therefore, a pity that the authors merely describe the financial aspects instead of backing up their findings with a critical assessment, for example, through a comparison of the spending patterns of the various organizations engaged in PSOs.
The main body of this volume is remarkable. Chapter by chapter, the most prominent peace operations of the present era are being examined, more specifically those in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina (by Cousens and Harland), Sierra Leone (by Berman and Labonte), the Democratic Republic of Congo (by Roessler and Prendergast), Kosovo (by Dziedzic), East Timor (by Smith and Dee) and finally - rather timely - a case study of the international efforts in Afghanistan (by Thier). At roughly 70-80 pages, each chapter follows a pre-set structure outlining in great detail the history of the conflict, the possible negotiation of peace settlements, the mandate granted by the international community, an assessment of the deployed capabilities and, finally, an evaluation of the achieved results and the prospects for sustainable peace. Because some of the PSOs dealt with in this book remain yet to be completed, the authors often cannot pronounce a final verdict regarding the success or failure of a particular mission. This is in itself indicative of the dilemma as to how to determine the moment of finalizing a PSO and withdrawing one's troops. The chapter on Kosovo (by Dziedzic) is an exception in that its conclusion contains many general insights that do not necessarily relate to the mission in question and that might have better fitted into the final chapter. In all other instances, however, Durch was able to enforce his strict structure upon the authors, thereby facilitating the readability of this colossal volume. In addition, the chapters include useful charts that present the reader with an array of details on the deployed financial and material means as well as background information specific to a particular operation (e.g., an overview of the various rebel factions involved in the Congolese conflict).
Finally, Durch rounds off the book with an attempt to draw some general lessons regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the reviewed PSOs, by looking at the internal and international legitimacy, the quality of the negotiated mandate, the scope of the means and the pace at which they were deployed, the role of leadership in missions, the use of policing forces and prosecution of war criminals. Durch concludes that the 'third surge' is overstretching the capabilities of the UN, because potential peacekeeping resources are wasted due to the international community's divisions and inability to cooperate. In his view, for example, the concept of PSOs is being misused by the United States to wage expeditionary wars. Acting unilaterally and being unable to provide the massive efforts necessary to post-conflict reconstruction have turned out to be a fatal mistake as the United States has had to acknowledge after its invasion of Iraq. Durch recognizes the contradiction between the moral imperative of imposing peace and the necessity of legitimacy, and realizes that no real solution to this dilemma can be offered without the concerted, multilateral effort and the political willpower of the international community.
It is regrettable that Durch spends so little space on this facet of the subject, as this seems to be the underlying crux as to why PSOs have thus far never met universal acceptance. Although the anthology's emphasis is clearly on practical aspects, the explanation, for example, that peace missions are imperative because the problems of failed states tend to expand or to be exported, strikes the reader as somewhat insufficient. The chapter would have benefited from a more elaborate discussion of the motives as to why states willingly engage in risky and very costly PSOs.
Nonetheless, the present volume is a welcome contribution to this particular field of study. The immensely rich case studies constitute a valuable work of reference for both scholars and practitioners. Because the authors make it clear that great expectations all too often result in even greater disappointments, the book inspires little optimism for those cherishing overbearingly idealist principles. Instead, the lens of pragmatism through which the authors scrutinize PSOs adds to a more nuanced understanding that succeeds in finding the right balance between tempering unrealistic ambitions and fatalistically rejecting the idea of peace operations as a whole.
One can only hope that Durch and his colleagues will, in the years to come, provide us with more first-class analyses on this subject, because the difficulties of bringing peace and stability to troubled nations are bound to gain more prominence in an era in which reality has caught up with the illusion of the 1990s that the world was nearing Fukuyama's end of history.