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Book Reviews: A Mini Symposium on
NATO has taken to describing itself as ‘one of the most successful alliances in history’. Although in so doing, NATO is presumably referring to its Cold War role and, in particular, its perceived success in deterring war with the Soviet Union. It has proved remarkably successful in another sense, namely, surviving. NATO was a product of the Cold War. It was designed with Cold War purposes in mind – in Lord Ismay’s famous terms, to keep the Germans down, the Russians out and the Americans in. It was founded when the Cold War was beginning to solidify and defined its core purpose in article five of the founding North Atlantic Treaty – that an attack against one member would be deemed an attack against all. Although the Soviet Union was not specified, it was quite clear where the presumed attack would come from. This ‘all-for-one’ role – one of collective defence – satisfied the Alliance throughout the Cold War, but with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet treat, it was no longer sufficient either to justify the continued existence of NATO or to meet the new demands of promoting security in Europe. If NATO was to survive, it had to transform itself from a collective defence organization into something else. This transformation is the subject of Yost’s book.
Of course, the story of NATO’s survival beyond the Cold War can be told from a number of angles, not least that of bureaucratic politics and an institution’s instincts for self-preservation. Yost’s focus, however, is much more instrumental: to survive, NATO had to find a new, more appropriate role. This new role, moreover, had to be appropriate not merely to the new security demands but to the Alliance’s political and military capabilities. For Yost, therein lies the rob. NATO has transformed itself by taking on new roles, including peacekeeping, crisis management and humanitarian assistance (the ‘Petersberg tasks’). While retaining its traditional role of collective defence, NATO has begun to develop a more ambitious role – or, for Yost, ‘aspiration’
– of promoting collective security. But it lacks both the political and (to a lesser extent in Yost’s analysis) military capabilities to pursue this wholeheartedly. Not least, political differences over where, when and how to intervene are rife in NATO and, if this new role is pursued more aggressively, may threaten the continued existence of the Alliance, whereas collective defence remains a permanent, defining task. Collective security has, therefore, been pursued on a more selective, opportunistic and ad hoc basis. Yost appears to be much happier with NATO as a collective defence organisation than as one promoting collective security – almost a NATO untransformed. One senses that for Yost, the simple existence of NATO is a good thing. It is a stabilising presence on an unstable continent. Developing a now role that may threaten the Alliance’s future is not, therefore, something to be welcomed with open arms.
This is a long, perhaps overlong, book, based, in part, on an impressively large number of interviews conducted in 1996/7. Despite the length of the book, there are just five chapters. After an introductory chapter setting out the aims of the book, Yost launches into a good, if somewhat orthodox, amount of NATO during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. The next two chapters on relations with former adversaries and on crisis management and peace operations form the heart of the book. The latter includes an extensive discussion of NATO’s role in Bosnia, but was written before the Kosovo operation. Similarly, the chapter on relations with former adversaries was written before the accession of the Visegrad three and NATO’s Washington summit in 1999. One suspects, however, that these more recent developments would have done little to change Yost’s overall argument that stands the test of time well. The book concludes with a chapter on ‘prospects and challenges’. It also includes a small number of appendices, containing key NATO documents. With the ready availability of these on the web, I do not particularly see the point of including them here. But these are small issues compared to the overall sense that the book could have been edged down into a rather shorter volume. For those familiar with NATO over the past decade, there is much here which is over familiar and, therefore, probably unnecessary (particularly as Yost tends to provide fairly orthodox accounts of events); for those unfamiliar, I am not certain that this provides an introductory volume. It would have been better to edit the work down to bring out the argument rather more clearly. What saves it, however, is Yost’s style, which is accessible and makes the book readily digestible.
As for Yost’s overall thesis, there will be many who disagree with him, but he has articulated a clear case, which requires a response. For myself, I believe Yost is probably correct in arguing that NATO has yet to successfully come to terms with its new roles, even after Washington and Kosovo. It may even be the case that these new roles are beyond the Alliance. But not to attempt them would not only have risked the credibility of the Alliance, making it an institutional dinosaur, but would have been to avoid its responsibilities. NATO was the only security institution that could have credibly responded to the crises and instability in Europe, particularly the Balkans. These were, and will continue to be, difficult issues, with legal, moral, political and military uncertainties. NATO could, of course, wash its hands of the whole affair, pleading that its role is simply one of collective defence. But this would be an abrogation of responsibility and would risk further instability undermining European security. NATO has chosen to accept the challenge; it may not succeed and this is what Yost fears. But not to attempt it also has its problems.
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