| Review of: | Ruling but not governing: the military and political development in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey by Steven A. Cook |
|---|---|
| Reviewed By: | Omar Ashour |
| Reviewed in: | International Affairs |
| Date accepted online: | 10/04/2008 |
| Published in print: | Volume 83, Issue 06, Pages 1193-1234 |
Book Reviews: Middle East and North Africa
Steven A. Cook highlights and attempts to answer two timely research questions in his book: what causes the endurance of authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa and under what conditions might these authoritarian regimes collapse? The case-studies are Egypt, Algeria and Turkey.
Regarding the endurance of authoritarianism, the author's argument is based on the notion that the military elite in these three states was able to manipulate a façade of democracy that featured elections, multiparty politics and a selectively freer press to sustain their authoritarian rule. Whereas such façades can signal an ongoing democratization process, actual political development is stalled through powerful presidencies, weak legislatures and sustained repression of political opposition through extra-constitutional security and military courts and emergency laws. In other words, Egypt, Algeria and, until recently, Turkey, are military-dominated states in which the army 'rules but does not govern'.
Regarding the other question about weakening authoritarianism and promoting democratization, Cook argues that without external support these two developments are unlikely to happen. 'Without an external catalyst for change it is likely that familiar patterns of authoritarian politics will endure in military-dominated states like Egypt and Algeria' (p. 148). The question becomes what kind of external support? After arguing that punitive policies (US policies regarding Libya and Iran) and coercive measures (the US in Iraq) are likely to fail with disastrous consequences, Cook advances the EU-Turkish incentives-based democratization process as a model for a smoother and relatively peaceful political development. He argues that the changes in Turkey are a direct result of the role the European Union, an external power, has played in promoting democracy through a series of incentives. These incentives helped to create an environment within Turkey conducive to reform. Cook acknowledges that it will take time to fully uproot Turkey's national security state. However, unlike Cairo and Algiers, Ankara is firmly on a democratic trajectory.
Cook's argument is solid, coherent and well supported by the empirical data he provides, based mainly on his extensive interviews and fieldtrips to Egypt and Turkey. The balance of power between the military and other state and societal institutions is incredibly tilted towards the former. Given that, as well as the lack of will of the military-dominated regimes to democratize, an external, pro-democracy balancer is necessary to intervene. Cook did not mention one striking example illustrating the necessity of foreign intervention and the weakness of the reformers. In 2005, the 'official' Egyptian opposition parties met with President Mubarak, withdrew their demands for presidential multi party elections and agreed to support the usual presidential referendum for 2005. However, after intense US pressure, Mubarak decided to hold multiparty presidential elections and amended the constitution.
The incentive-based approach to support democratization is an insightful policy recommendation. However, as Cook briefly mentions, there are several differences between the Egyptian-American and Algerian-French cases on the one hand, and the EU-Turkish case on the other. First, as Cook acknowledges, public opinion matters more in Turkey compared to Egypt and Algeria. In Turkey, public pressures for joining the EU and initiating reforms have directly affected the military's behaviour. On the other hand, popular support for the FIS in Algeria did not prevent the January 1992 coup from taking place and the relative popularity of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt did not prevent the regular crackdowns on them in the 1990s and 2000s.
In addition, there are several differences between the behaviour of the Turkish, Egyptian and Algerian military establishments that Cook could have elaborated upon to enrich his argument. The Turkish military withdrew from direct rule on several occasions to support a quasi-democracy process. This was never the case in Egypt and Algeria. In Egypt, the military has been ruling since 1952 (Mubarak is an Air Force Marshal). In Algeria, colonels and generals ruled from 1965 until 1999 and have been very influential actors from 1999 until the present day. Moreover, opposition was regularly repressed, even during the short periods of 'liberalization' in Egypt and Algeria. Given that, internal political variables have helped the relatively smooth transition in Turkey, whereas the military is still the uncontested political force in Egypt and Algeria.
There are a few empirical inaccuracies in the book. For example, the claim that the Egyptian Muslim Brothers 'did drop its opposition to participation in Egyptian politics in the 1970s' (p. 11; p. 78) is quite inaccurate, since the Brothers participated in parliamentary elections as early as 1945. Also the claim that the Algerian regime has militarily resolved the crisis with the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) is also inaccurate, as there were intensive political negotiations between Madani Mizraq, the Emir of the AIS, and General Isma'il Lamari, deputy-head of the military intelligence. The talks were followed by the 'Law for Civil Concord' and the 'Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation', both of which were crucial for putting an end to some of the bloodshed in Algeria. Currently, Mizraq has declared his intention to establish a political party, mainly from former AIS guerrillas and FIS supporters.
Finally, although Cook provides elaborate policy recommendations for US policy-makers with regard to Egypt, he does not mention any specific recommendations regarding Algeria.