| Review of: | Iran and the bomb: the abdication of international responsibility by Thérèse Delpech |
|---|---|
| Reviewed By: | Joanna Kidd |
| Reviewed in: | International Affairs |
| Date accepted online: | 10/04/2008 |
| Published in print: | Volume 83, Issue 06, Pages 1193-1234 |
Book Reviews: Middle East and North Africa
In common with other commentators, Delpech traces the origins of Iran's nuclear ambitions, in respect of both power and weapons, back to the Shah's regime of the 1970s. Bringing her analysis forward to the current Iranian regime, she takes the view that Iran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons and has been so since 1985, an assertion which is generally accepted by western analysts. However, unlike many others, she argues that the regime is monolithic and consequently more difficult to deal with than many in the West believe. Since June 2005, Iran has, she maintains, engaged in a period of deliberate confrontation about its nuclear programme, with the aim of presenting the world with a fait accompli of an uncontrollable process that will result in its acquisition of nuclear weapons. Hitherto, Delpech argues, Iran has not paid any price for this policy, despite the potentially dire consequences for the Middle East and the global non-proliferation regime of Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons.
The reason why Iran has so far emerged unscathed forms the main part of the book. According to Delpech, the international community is simply incapable of organizing a coordinated and effective response. Her definition of this community is interesting as it extends beyond the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) plus the EU, the actors which most analysis has focused on as they have been most prominent in responding to Iran's nuclear programme. Her analysis also includes actors as varied as India, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is a useful addition to the existing literature to have so wide an approach taken as it provides fresh perspectives on this topic. Delpech is critical of all the actors cited, arguing that the United States does not really have a policy on Iran; that the EU's diplomatic efforts have served only to give Iran more time; Russia has been an unreliable partner for everyone; Pakistan may still not have given all the details about its past cooperation with Iran and that the IAEA has been so reluctant to recognize Iran's violations that the latter's neutrality has been put at stake. Other actors mentioned have not taken a strong line against Iran, she argues, because they are compromised by commercial interests in the latter's oil and gas reserves or geo-strategic motives, both of which they give a higher priority to than the ending of Iran's nuclear programme. Although the short length of the sections on each actor (in some cases just four pages) means that the arguments put forward are sometimes generalized and also rather alarmist, the overall analysis of an ineffective and almost leaderless international response is persuasive.
The analysis is strengthened by the fact that the book went to press in August 2006, and over a year later the Iranian case is still before the UNSC and unresolved. Delpech's proposed solution, which she does not expect to be taken, is for the UNSC to adopt a policy of a phased imposition of sanctions on Iran's oil and gas industries and not to rule out use of force; further negotiations, she contends, would be useless and irresponsible, as it would given Iran more time in which to work on its nuclear programme. The extent to which one agrees with this solution, and it is a proposition that must now be being discussed in Washington and some other capital cities, will depend to a large degree on whether one agrees with her view that the Iranian regime is monolithic.