| Review of: | Building a new Afghanistan edited by Robert I. Rotberg |
|---|---|
| Reviewed By: | J. Alexander Their |
| Reviewed in: | International Affairs |
| Date accepted online: | 10/04/2008 |
| Published in print: | Volume 83, Issue 06, Pages 1193-1234 |
Book Reviews: Middle East and North Africa
It is difficult to envisage a more complex and unyielding set of challenges than those presented by Afghanistan in 2001. To use an expression of Ali Jalali, former Interior Minister of Afghanistan and one of the authors of
Afghanistan's state institutions, gradually established between 1880 and 1978, were hollowed out by years of regime change and civil war and transformed under the Taleban into a breeding ground for the forces of global jihadism. Taking this shell and turning it into a modern democratic state with a free-market economy is the grand conceit of both the international community's self-appointed mandate in Afghanistan and of this book. In his introductory chapter, Rotberg begins by acknowledging that even in the notoriously difficult arena of post-conflict state-building, Afghanistan presents an 'extreme' case. And as most of the chapter authors point out, these nation-building dreams founder on twin shoals. First, Afghanistan is no
The authors, several of whom have been directly involved in Afghanistan's efforts at recovery, are enthusiastic if not optimistic. Hedayat Amin Arsala, the former minister of commerce, outlines an unprecedented set of challenges facing Afghanistan, but argues in the next breath that the assets available for 'a major national transformation are greater still'. Even the most buoyant chapter, Alastair McKechnie's treatment of the dramatic rebound of the Afghan economy, is tempered by warning of fragility and stumbling blocks like illiteracy and bureaucracy. Or, as Paula Newberg says, 'Obstacles to fulfilling the promise of recovery and reconstruction remain significant and sobering'.
What this collection shouts, but never really says, is that we need to lower our expectations of what is possible in Afghanistan and similar environments. The authors have all done their homework, and the chapters are packed with information about history and contemporary arrangements. The weakest part of this volume is the bane of so many policy books: the recommendations many of the authors feel compelled to tack onto their fine analysis. After exhaustive descriptions of the problems and prospects, broad calls for new programmes and new working groups hardly seem to meet the challenges the authors themselves pose.
One of the things this book accomplishes is an understanding of the complex interaction between politics, security, the economy and the rule of law. Each of these forces has the power to drive or undermine recovery as a whole, and so treating them in concert is not only useful but necessary. This holistic perspective is much needed in the halls of governments that direct resources into countries transitioning from war to peace.
Another important theme of the book is the informality of Afghanistan's political, legal and economic arrangements, and how resistant these can be to formalization. Afghanistan is not chaotic, it is atomic-most people continue to live and work in face-to-face communities where family relations, history and custom far supersede such impersonal institutions as formal legal systems. Engaging with informality, rather than ignoring it, is clearly something the international community and the fledgling Karzai government need to learn.
The jury is still out on Afghanistan, and this book is packed with information about policy strategies that have yet to bear fruit. Until definitive accounts of this period of state-building emerge in the years ahead, Rotberg's volume provides a thorough account of the efforts thus far.