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The title of Walker's book refers to the motto of Italian tank crews. It is the author's thesis that they did indeed possess 'iron hearts'. He does much to right a wrong-that Italian armed forces were all 'surrender monkeys' who ran or waved white flags at the sound of gunfire. Such a historical libel has been the stuff of condescending jests and popular culture since the Second World War.

Walker, a keen historian who works for the Scottish Executive, begins with a useful and concise survey of why Italy joined the Axis and why the country was so ill equipped in every sense to fight it. He describes the development of the armoured divisions and their role and exploits in North Africa, both before and after Rommel's Afrika Korps became the dominant desert force. He concludes that the Italian overall performance was far better than history relates and that too little allowance has been made for deficiencies of armour and guns.

Walker quotes selectively and perhaps could profitably have talked to Italian and British veterans, rather than rely on battalion diaries and past accounts. His crusade-to defend Italian martial valour against the sneers of its detractors-is admirable and timely but does impose a visible bias in the narrative.

The British had poor equipment too; but with this they won the stunning victory of Beda Fomm (in February 1941, just before the arrival of Italian armoured divisions) in which Graziani's Tenth Army and the Italian Air Force were shattered. The victory of Wavell and O'Connor had been made possible by good intelligence and daring, both of which Italian commanders lacked. One example: British front-line commanders insisted on nightly raids to find out the identity and composition of enemy units opposite; the Italians preferred not to. This reluctance resulted in the Italians identifying Indian troops as Congolese!

The Italians invaded Egypt with superior numbers of troops and were outfought. They were too static, they stuck rigidly to roads and their air component was obsolete. Infantry morale was mostly poor, fascism not having had the stiffening effect of national socialism. In Malaya and Singapore in 1941-2 the British suffered a similar fate for the same reasons of rigidity and obsolescence. A tenacious and skilful enemy outfought them, with the Japanese making use of jungle considered by the British to be impenetrable. The Italians, however, were much closer to their home base. Inferior armour and air cover were also decisive factors in the British defeat in France in 1940, when they were outflanked and outmanoeuvred.

The author supports his partisan approach by quoting the indisputably daring exploits of the Italian armoured divisions Ariete and Littorio at Tobruk, Gazala and Alamein (especially the spirited charge of vulnerable tanks and self-propelled guns against the well-dug-in British six-pounder anti-tank guns at Snipe, the decisive tactical battle of Alamein, which broke the back of Rommel's counter-attack). But he ignores awkward questions-the role of the Italian Air Force, the competence of junior leadership, why Rommel used Italians as primarily blocking or reserve troops, the competence of Italian staff work, why the Italians were not often trusted with German equipment (when they did borrow an 88 they fired in excess of 1,700 shells at a handful of British tanks, a rate of expenditure that leads to a suspicion that they might have been trying to expend their ammunition as an excuse to flee). Rommel did not appreciate-during the confusion of battle at Mersa Matruh on 27 June 1942-being machine gunned by Littorio. Even elite troops can get jumpy. It cannot have enhanced Rommel's respect for Littorio in particular and Italians in general.

Walker is generous to the Italian forces as a whole. He rightly points out the vulnerability of Italian convoys in the Mediterranean and the effect of Ultra intelligence on shipping losses. The limited rail capacity along their extended supply line was a perpetual handicap. Walker could have pointed out a valid excuse for the inadequacies of the Italian regular divisions. The very fact that there were elites like Littorio, Ariete and-later in Tunisia-Centauro, drained the rest of the army of the best men, non-commissioned officers and officers. It is the way with elite troops, as the Germans found to their cost in the battles on the Western Front of 1918 and in Normandy in 1944.

But Walker has done a useful service and his own line drawings of tanks and the maps are illuminating. The index is not. His conclusion that Italian elite armoured divisions were as good as other elites including 21st Panzer is charitable (Rommel of course did not share such a view). In an important appendix he compares the performances of British and Italian tank weaponry in 1941-2. It is perhaps the crux of his argument because it purports to reveal the weakness of Italian firepower and protection. But it is misleading and sometimes wrong. The British Valentine II tank had 65mm armour only on the turret, not as he implies all over. He records data for the British Crusader II tank, which is actually for the Crusader I. The turret and front protection of the Stuart tank was 38mm not 51mm, which is the correct figure for the front hull of the Grant/Lee. Two can play at anoraks, but the discrepancies are important because they tend to overstate the strength of Allied armour.

I have listened to 8th Army veterans for many years discussing the merits of Italian troops and armour, and their assessment is fairly uniform (it is often wise to talk to the man who was there). Their elite troops and armour fought bravely but were let down by poor leadership and kit. Their junior officers did not ensure the safety and comfort of their troops before looking to their own. Even their rations-tuna followed by tuna-were regarded as misguided as the flavour is too strong and pungent for daily ingestion. But I like to think the Italians were brought down by the Sukhomlinov effect, named after the debauched, corrupt and incompetent Russian war minister during the First World War who favoured absurdly fancy uniforms. The effect states that 'victory in war goes to those armies whose leaders' uniforms are least impressive'. With their silly plumed hats and Ruritanian tassles, the Italians were doomed.

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