| Review of: | The United States, Western Europe and the Polish crisis: International Relations in the second Cold War by Helene Sjursen |
|---|---|
| Reviewed By: | Ray Taras |
| Reviewed in: | International Affairs |
| Date accepted online: | 27/07/2004 |
| Published in print: | Volume 80, Issue 2, Pages 367-414 |
History
This addition to Palgrave's Cold War History series returns to the contentious subject of the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. Instead of examining the question that has intrigued Cold War scholars since new archival material became available to them in recent years-whether Poland's General Wojciech Jaruzelski acted largely on his own in reaching this decision or was he to some degree or other forced to take it by Kremlin leaders-Helene Sjursen focuses on the West's response to the Polish crisis. Were the principal western actors-the United States, Britain, France and West Germany-in agreement, she asks, as to what action to take? Did an interest-based approach-exemplified by the self-regarding actor-dominate the response of the western allies? Or were value- and rights-based approaches-the former grounded in a community's normative conception of itself, the latter in universal standards of justice-also influential in shaping the western states' reaction?
The author, a senior researcher at ARENA (Advanced Research on the Europeanization of the Nation State) in Oslo, uses hard and soft primary sources to propose answers to these questions. Government reports, declassified documents, and interviews with policy-makers comprise the first category; newspaper reports, public discourse and memoir literature encompass the second. In order to avoid monocausal explanations, Sjursen attempts 'to analyse the probable reasons for the policies developed by the western allies and thereby to explain the outcome' (p. 15). Paradoxically, the author's argumentation often is more convincing than the facts she marshals. Indeed, the primary soft sources used-in particular, the statements made by prime ministers, presidents and foreign ministers-contribute little to explaining the course of events in 1981 and after.
Sjursen believes that the institutional structures in existence in the West at that time were inadequate to ensure coordinated action. But the US, especially President Ronald Reagan's administration, was also to blame. 'If there was a misperception, then it was in the form of the United States overestimating its influence in the alliance' (p. 88). In addition, there was hypocrisy in the US position: 'The policy of defending human rights and democracy was conducted according to the premises of power politics' (p. 102). Not surprisingly, 'when cooperation broke down after the imposition of martial law, it was not only because of diverging views on détente but also because the United States broke with the agreed norms of the alliance' (p. 144).
During the crisis the Reagan administration took unilateral actions and often presented Western Europe with
The author highlights a conflict over a more important and general issue: 'there was a difference between European and superpower
If much of this disagreement between Western Europe and the United States over how to respond to martial law in Poland sounds familiar, that is the author's intention. She concludes her study by acknowledging that 'The particular context in which this book was written helps to explain its particular focus... Differing views on norm enforcement and Europe's concern about American unilateralism are not new, although the context in which they are played out has changed' (p. 146). The conflict between the Atlantic partners over the 1981 Polish crisis may possibly be overdramatized in Sjursen's account. Then again, if that conflict seems less dramatic today, it is because of the events over the past two years which have caused more serious rifts between much of Europe and the United States.