| Review of: | The Labour governments 1964-1970, volume two: international policy by John W. Young |
|---|---|
| Reviewed By: | Michael F. Hopkins |
| Reviewed in: | International Affairs |
| Date accepted online: | 27/07/2004 |
| Published in print: | Volume 80, Issue 2, Pages 367-414 |
History
Harold Wilson may have become prime minister in 1964 on a wave of optimism, but his governments of 1964-70 have long suffered from a low reputation. A new series of three studies attempts to reassess them. John Young's volume examines international policy (traditional diplomacy plus economic, defence and colonial considerations). It is arranged around six themes: the withdrawal from east of Suez; South and East Asia; the Middle East and the Mediterranean; the Atlantic alliance and
The highly effective introductory chapter scrutinizes key ministers and officials and the policy-making structure, including the roles of intelligence and relations with the media. It is very good on Wilson: a political virtuoso, adept at short-term solutions, whose major flaw was 'an almost pathetic desire to boast about his influence over foreign leaders, especially those in Moscow and Washington' (p. 4). The question of Britain's place in the world was central to Wilson's foreign policy. The decision to abandon a military presence east of Suez was announced in 1967. Young accepts the importance of economic pressures but also acknowledges the role of non-economic factors. Anti-imperialist opinion and the application to join the EEC pointed the country away from such commitments. In addition, George Brown as Foreign Secretary and Roy Jenkins as Chancellor pressed for withdrawal. Young also highlights a paradox in Wilson's position: the prime minister might have spoken enthusiastically about Britain's continued commitment to its world role, but the decision in November 1964 to restrict defence spending to £2 billion meant that it was unlikely that such a role could continue to be funded (p. 55). Young concludes that, though government policy might have lacked something in its speed and decisiveness, an orderly imperial retreat was achieved (p. 56).
Meanwhile, there was a tangle of issues in South and East Asia: Chinese pressure on Hong Kong, clashes between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the concerns about China's pressure on India. The key problems were the confrontation between Indonesia and the Malaysian Federation and Vietnam. The British conducted a successful low-intensity fight on behalf of Malaysia. Wilson managed to avoid involving British troops in Vietnam. The Middle East witnessed the sorry tale of Aden. Wilson inherited an ill-judged policy from Macmillan. Wilson's government did little to improve the situation, leaving Aden in November 1967. The departures from both the Gulf and Aden reduced the importance of the staging posts-Gibraltar, Libya, Malta and Cyprus. But it did not prove so easy to quit some of these posts. Young aptly sums up Wilson's policy of shifting from a regional military presence with ties to traditional rulers to withdrawal and a readiness to adjust to the radical elements. Again 'policy change was far from smooth or determined' (p. 109). Moreover, the shift was not that great, for there was continued, if reduced, military and diplomatic involvement in the region.
In Europe there were troubles about schemes for nuclear sharing, over de Gaulle's 1966 decision to withdraw France from the NATO integrated command, about Greece remaining a member of NATO when the country was under martial law. Another issue centred on the funding of the British Army of the Rhine. British determination to pursue
Over South Africa Wilson sought to balance his government's moral outrage towards apartheid with practical considerations-the Simonstown naval base used by the Royal Navy, South Africa's anti-communist stance, its valuable minerals and the sizeable British investment there. So he condemned them without applying strict economic pressures. Policy on Rhodesia was a messy attempt to try to prevent the white settlers from declaring independence, while remaining reluctant to be too tough for fear of the economic consequences for Zambia and, indeed, for Britain. The Nigerian civil war was another reminder that the abandonment of the Suez role did not mean an end to commitments born of empire (p. 193). The importance of oil assets and fears of Soviet penetration if Britain withdrew from the area led to a rather ambiguous policy of neutrality towards the official Federal Military government.
Young concludes that, despite inheriting a crumbling global position, there was no 'disastrous failure' (p. 219). Yet the government was slow to change. Only when the postwar framework of Keynesian economics collapsed did policy shift from a world role to a European focus. For Young the two great decisions-to quit Malaysia-Singapore and to join the EEC-were taken 'without any attempt to link the two in the relevant meetings' (p. 221). He adds there was 'often a sense of policy being made in haste, with limited thought about consistency or even consequences' (p. 223). The government seemed to accept the changes reluctantly. Decision-making was characterized by 'confusion and uncertainty' (p. 225).
This is an impressively thorough analysis. Young has rooted his investigation in considerable research in government and private papers, as well as an extensive and critical grasp of the latest literature, including a large number of Ph.D. dissertations. His judgements on the individual issues are thoughtful and astute. His overall verdict is equally sound. He accurately captures the press of issues and the way ministers responded. The result is a better understanding of the difficulties the governments confronted and a recognition that the outcome was not as bad as many contemporaries and subsequent historians have suggested. By the 1970s the British had succeeded in matching resources to aims. Whether this enhances the reputation of Wilson's governments is open to question, given that this was accomplished 'more by muddle and a collapse of alternatives than any long-term vision' (p. 226).