The contributions to this volume are organized around a critique of the dominant “realist” approach to strategic adjustment, according to which any state’s security policy is determined by the external constraints—especially the distribution of power and threats—presented by the international system. By contrast, the work in this book is based on the position that, especially in times of peace, the choice of grand strategy is shaped primarily by domestic politics and social forces. “While international constraints may limit the range of choice open to statesmen, in the final analysis their decisions about grand strategy are critically shaped by domestic politics and the factors that influence it—political ideologies, state structure, and societal interests” (5). In turn, the book itself is organized around these factors. After an excellent introduction, the chapters are divided into sections that examine the impact of “ideas and culture,” that of the conflict among domestic political interests, and the role of the institutions and bureaucracies of the state in shaping strategic choice. Each section provides a balance of theoretical and empirically oriented chapters, many of which focus on the decision of the United States in the 1890s to build a world class “blue water” navy and thus enter the world of European power politics. The arguments of the book are nicely pulled together in a concluding chapter.

That any nation’s strategic vision and choice are deeply shaped by its domestic politics may not seem a particularly arresting claim, and is perhaps less unprecedented a view in strategic studies than the authors claim. Nevertheless, it is clear that realist assumptions retain a dominant hold on the field, and the contributors to this volume present a persuasive challenge to these assumptions. This reviewer found particularly refreshing the attempt to go beyond simple criticism of realism to develop an alternative framework for understanding the interaction of international and domestic factors in shaping policy choice and change. These chapters focus primarily on developing the concepts and questions necessary for such a framework—often providing clear hypotheses and the effective use of case studies to assess them—thus advancing the field much more positively than most volumes critical of realism. Among the book’s other virtues are (generally) clear writing, a nice balance of theoretical and empirical work, an unusual degree of attention paid by each author to the other essays in the volume, and the success of the introduction and conclusion in demonstrating the way the various contributors build on each other’s insights. The chapters by Rhodes, Trubowitz, and Bremer are all especially impressive and substantial contributions. Each focuses on American strategic adjustment in the 1890s, uses the case to elaborate the importance of one particular explanatory factor—changing cultural norms and ideals (Rhodes), the maneuvering of regionally based interests in domestic politics (Trubowitz), and military technological change (Bremer)—and attempts to put its argument in the context of the other two essays. In general, the contributors and their arguments are well known in the field, but this book allows for a succinct and concentrated presentation of the nature and significance of these ideas and the debates between the protagonists.

As in every edited volume, of course, the quality of the chapters is uneven, though the overall level is high. In particular, some of the empirical case studies are too lacking in clear elaborations of their theoretical significance, forcing the editors into some strained attempts to clarify their relation to the larger themes of the volume. The most glaring overall limitation is the lukewarm effort to bring the work to bear on the current situation facing the makers of American strategy. Besides a well-done case study of the changes in the U.S. Navy’s strategic plans, the reader is left with a smattering of interesting but under-elaborated comments on the current choices and options facing U.S. policy makers. The volume develops the tools for further research on this issue, but not the substantive analysis that might interest the general reader.

Overall, this is a stimulating and innovative book. It should be of special interest to scholars, analysts, and participants in the making of American grand strategy, but should also interest scholars exploring the causes and nature of change in American public policy more generally, especially policy making involving the nation’s place in the larger global environment. The book may have some use in upper-level undergraduate courses, but will be especially useful reading for graduate courses in strategic studies and in the theoretical dimensions of the study of public policy.