For Scott the origins of such schemes can be found in the goals of the modern state and the assumptions of modern science. The state and science have worked together often in the modern age, both seeking to control and shape nature and society. For states such control is the most efficient way to collect revenues and amass wealth. For science the control of nature and society provides an opportunity to perfect an imperfect world. The complexity of the world, however, presents a challenge to the state and science in their efforts to understand it. Especially for the state, nature and society appear disorderly and often undecipherable. To be effective in its collection of taxes and management of resources, the state must make legible what is illegible. For help in doing this the modern state has often turned to science.

In approaching the question of change, twentieth-century politicians and scientists have been heavily influenced by what Scott terms “high modernist” thinking. A defining characteristic of high modernism is its supreme confidence in the ability of science to improve nature and society. Ambitious schemes that seek large-scale transformation are the order of the day. Such plans simplify the world and make it intelligible. With their sights set on the “big picture,” scientists and political leaders are able to “see” their country’s natural, political, social, and economic landscapes more clearly. Such clarity, however, obscures what is really happening on the ground. Reality fades beneath the broad brush strokes of deductive theory. Local differences and practices are assumed away. Even though no longer “visible,” reality in all its complexity remains. Ignoring the facts makes social and economic transformation no less challenging, simply more attractive. In applying formulaic solutions to complex environments, grand schemes are almost certain to fail. Their assumptions are too far removed from reality. Designed for anywhere, such plans apply nowhere very well. The potential for success, Scott convincingly argues, lies hidden in the details.

The logic of high modernism, however, runs counter to any genuine consideration of such details. The problem is in high modernism’s understanding of knowledge. For high modernists the only beneficial knowledge is epistemic. While epistemic knowledge certainly is important, Scott’s study reveals its limits. He suggests that instead of relying exclusively on epistemic knowledge, decision-makers and scientists should include practical knowledge, or “metis,” in their calculations. “The practice and experience reflected in metis is almost always local” (317). In taking into account local knowledge, “the size and importance of the gap between general knowledge and situated knowledge” becomes apparent (318). Recognition of this gap, Scott believes, should give the authors of grand schemes reason to reconsider what they think they know about the world and how it works. In considering local and general knowledge together, experts will come to appreciate the limits of high modernist thinking and ultimately will approach their planning more carefully and scientifically. Though they will still make mistakes, their errors in judgment will be less harmful to society.

One problem, of course, is getting the state and science to pay attention to metis. The most effective way to do this, Scott suggests, is through the development and strengthening of liberal democratic political and economic institutions. Such institutions make it more difficult for the state and experts to dominate the policy process, thus making it more likely that citizens, the primary bearers of practical knowledge, will have a voice.

Basing his study on original research, and drawing support from a large body of literature from both political science and anthropology, Scott makes a compelling case about the hazards of relying too heavily on high modernist thinking, and of placing too much power in the hands of the state. High modernism, combined with the coercive power of the state, is often a destructive and sometimes deadly force. Surely, Seeing Like a State is a cautionary tale.

Without doubt, this is an important book and should be of interest to anyone studying state-led efforts to transform nature or society. In an era of neoliberal dominance, Scott’s core arguments are especially relevant. Rigid and formulaic, neoliberal economic theory simplifies reality and assumes away many of the details. Acting as the bearers of “universal” truths, neoliberal economists are very much a part of the high modernist tradition. Even though the goal of neoliberals is the creation of a free market, their methods for achieving this end are essentially coercive. Such criticism is not meant to imply that the creation of free market economies is undesirable, that neoliberals lack good intentions, or that little can be learned from neoliberal economic theory. Instead it is to suggest, as Scott does, that even when the goal is good, intentions are honorable, and epistemic knowledge is useful, the implementation of high modernist schemes can have disastrous consequences. Seeing Like a State reminds us that while vision is important, the details still matter.