Together, the recent publications of Anton Zijderveld, The Waning of the Welfare State, and Bill Jordan, The New Politics of Welfare, provide illuminating examples of the three schools. Zijderveld adopts what he calls a “cultural-sociological” approach whereas Jordan draws upon both rational choice and structuralist theories. Their common case is the welfare state. In particular, both address the seemingly ongoing transformation of the welfare state. This gives us ample opportunities to highlight the similarities and differences in their theoretical approaches and concomitant ontology, methodology, and comparison strategy as well as a basis for a more general discussion of their main results and claims.

Zijderveld’s book deals with the so-called comprehensive welfare state that prevailed in Northern Europe, including the UK, in the 1960s and 1970s. Since then, the author argues, this type of welfare state has been in a process of transformation. The comprehensive welfare state is characterized as both very intensive and extensive, that is, penetrating deeply into the lives of its citizens on a wide range of areas and dominating the market, the civil society, the polity, and the culture. The comprehensive welfare state is a distinct (Northern) European phenomenon, as the American culture is prohibitive for the development of this type of welfare state. Zijderveld claims that (1) the origins of the comprehensive welfare state can be traced back to the sixteenth century, (2) not as a product of socialist forces but rather as a blueprint largely initiated and influenced by conservatism; (3) that “etatism” in the 1960s and 1970s curbed free initiative in the market and civil society, (4) which constituted a moral crisis of the welfare state, so far largely neglected in social science; (5) however, the dominance of the state has been balanced by the reinvigoration of the market in the 1980s, (6) and the 1990s is the decade of civil society—the “well of all morality.” Zijderveld’s view on the comprehensive welfare state is that of a conservative critic, and, accordingly, he judges recent development to be of a positive nature. In fact, he thinks that Northern Europe may be facing a new era—the era of the “democratic triangle”—where the countervailing forces of the market (liberalism), state (socialism), and the civil society (conservatism) have the promise of a new and better society.

Zijderveld’s use and particular interpretation of basic (dualist) concepts such as “formal” and “substantial” rationality, “organization” vs. “institution,” resembles in many ways that of the classical sociologists, especially Weber and Durkheim. From Weber, Zijderveld adopts the theme of the impact of cultural forces on societal development and that of the continuing rationalization of society as portrayed in his account of the development of the welfare state. The Durkheimean aspect is illustrated in Zijderveld’s explicit interest in the moral foundations and constitution of the various welfare-state types, as well as his firm belief in the ultimate victory of the benevolent forces of “morality,” that is, through civil society, in the 1990s and beyond.

To be blunt, Zijderveld’s way of reasoning, his distinct use of the concepts from classical sociology, and his account of historical development in the position of the “enlightened” storyteller, gives the impression of an author writing in a sociological language and tradition that might easily be characterized as old-fashioned. Moreover, his claim that the main challenge of the welfare state is its moral erosion of civil society and civic responsibility that has not been addressed previously in the academic literature seems a far cry from reality. Already in the 1960s discussions roared on the Leviathan nature of the welfare state. Budget-maximizing bureaucrats, voter-seeking politicians, and the so-called knowledge elite were said to nurture their own interests at the detriment of the population in general and the vulnerable in particular. This attack on the welfare state in Europe came primarily from the Right, but was echoed a decade later from the Left in its critique of the fossilized nature of the welfare state that made it unable to respond to new needs and post-material values. In some respects, Zijderveld thus writes himself into a discussion that had its zenith twenty years ago.

The main aim of Bill Jordan’s book, The New Politics of Welfare, is to analyze the contents and implications of the welfare reforms that have taken place in the U.S. and the United Kingdom in the 1990s. More specifically, Jordan focuses on what he recognizes as the emerging “new orthodoxy” of the Clinton and Blair administrations. The new orthodoxy concerns the similar reform efforts in the two countries to reduce public expenditure on social welfare and to remold people’s expectations of social security. Whereas Jordan acknowledges the need for the new orthodoxy’s proactive and adaptive strategies to adjust the welfare state in a global environment, his stance toward the social reformist projects is that of a left-wing critic. He emphatically criticizes the new politics of welfare for the harsh, authoritarian, and moralistic means by which it aspires to achieve its goals. The new orthodoxy’s appeal to a hard work ethic, to the concept of national renewal, and its—for Jordan—peculiar sense of social justice, promotes a course of political action that has a great impact on certain nonprivileged groups and that is not adjusted to the conditions of a postmodern (pluralist culture, multiculturalism, etc.), globalized (information and reflexivity, the nation-state, supranational power), and economically disorganized world (system). Furthermore, the new orthodoxy legitimates its outlook on the labor market and social policy on a set of moral and ethic values that Jordan regards as inappropriate or even harmful as a basis for reforming social welfare.

Jordan combines the structuralist and rationalist approach as he explores the significance of both economic and political (i.e., structural), (pre)conditions as well as the rational strategies and actions taken by the advocates of the new orthodoxy. Public choice theory constitutes one main source of explanation through which Jordan explores the conception of social and distributive justice underlying the new orthodoxy and materialized in the new politics of welfare. But he further draws on what he recognizes as normative theory—that is, the more general conception of justice as reflected in political thought. These two bodies of literature make up the principal, theoretical frame of reference. While this may be the case, Jordan still, in a convincing way, draws on a large and diverse range of both theoretical and empirical literature to substantiate his argument, and he is thus not blinded by his initial theoretical framework.

The two authors agree the welfare state is facing massive challenges, but not on their nature. For Jordan these challenges are primarily of a structural and exogenous character. The irresistible forces of globalization, postmodernization, and an economically disorganized world-system necessitate a rethinking of “business as usual.” Zijderveld, by contrast, portrays the challenges as primarily endogenous to the welfare state. The comprehensive welfare state coexisted with, if not contributed to, an immoral ethos of its citizens, where everybody tried to get as much as possible and contribute as little as possible. This led to a morally corrupting and economically unsustainable situation.

Both authors also agree that national governments’ recent responses to these challenges mark fundamental breaks in ideology. In characterizing the new orthodoxy in theoretical terms Jordan makes the interesting observation that the new orthodoxy draws on two major political and philosophical strands: on the one hand, an Anglo-Saxon liberal-contractarian line of thought emphasizing the civil and political rights of the individual (citizen); and on the other hand a continental-European solidaristic philosophic tradition in which the collective, moral responsibilities of the citizen toward the community and the family (“the principle of reciprocity”) hold a major significance. The new orthodoxy is thus an ideological “hybrid,” stressing both individual and (small and meso-scale) collective aspects of the citizen’s role (a self-proclaimed “third way”). In extrapolating the Dutch experience to the rest of Northern Europe, Zijderveld notes the increased importance of liberalism in the form of privatization and increased consumer choice, and of conservatism, exemplified in a renewed emphasis on values and norms in schooling and through an appreciation of traditional collective organizations and institutions.

The case approach is used in both studies. This allows for an informed understanding of the countries at hand, which, in turn, supports the author’s goals of advancing new theory and interpreting its significance (also Ragin). However, this comparison strategy is not useful for identifying broad patterns, testing theories, or making predictions. And this is also the drawback of the two studies. Jordan seems aware of this when he explicitly states that he deals only with the experience of two countries, and he does not attempt to derive universal laws on this basis. Zijderveld is more troublesome. He primarily rests his argument on the basis of one country only—the UK for the history of the welfare state and the Netherlands for recent developments—but generalizes its validity to, at least, the Northern European countries. This does not take into account the institutional differences between countries. It is still to be seen whether the speed, extent, and direction of change are the same across countries starting from different places. Hence, the case of convergence in the form of a waning or restructuration of the welfare state is less straight-forward than claimed. On a more general note, it can be argued that the welfare state as an institution is more resilient to change than both authors acknowledge, even the comprehensive Nordic model (e.g., Kautto et al. 1999).

Both Jordan and Zijderveld build their analyses on a number of certain presuppositions about the way the world is constructed, that is, ontological assumptions. For Jordan, being inspired by both the rationalist and structuralist paradigms, the actions taken by rational actors that constitute the new orthodoxy are closely entwined with a number of structural circumstances, in particular, economic and social processes of globalization. The new politics of welfare, as it is presented by Jordan, is thus to be perceived as both the outcome of an intentional political strategy and the result of a range of concomitant structural forces and their impact on actual politics. In this respect, Jordan, although spending most of his energy on explaining the “rational” policy-perspective of the new orthodoxy, seems to grant the two aspects equal importance. In contrast, Zijderveld sees culture, understood as intersubjective norms and values, as the basis for social order. Where the comprehensive welfare state contributed to a perversion of the moral logic of tradition, to an “immoral ethos,” the revitalization of the market and, in particular, civil society has meant a return to a more sustainable situation, a “moral ethos.”

The state–market–civil society nexus is a key analytical framework for both authors. The new orthodoxy draws on all three sources of social resources. The state is considered the legitimate authority or instrument through which the new politics of welfare is carried out. The picture presented by Jordan is that of a unified, centralized political will; the role of the political process and actors of the opposition is largely neglected. The market is used as the fount of principles of social justice, of national prosperity (hence the new orthodoxy’s emphasis on a strong work ethic and high rates of participation), and furthermore as generating a socially regulating moral sentiment and a “sense of reciprocity.” This principle of reciprocity, theoretically derived from the social and moral principles of civil society, is central to the new orthodoxy and concerns the civic obligations of the citizen. While claiming social rights the citizen should also recognize the responsibilities these rights entail: first and foremost, the compulsory obligation to pay taxes and to participate in the formal economy, but also, secondly, a range of somewhat diffuse moral obligations concerning self-provision and self-responsibility. The new orthodoxy’s vision of the citizen is thus that of an empowered, self-providing, and self-sustaining yet socially responsible person who does his or her best not to encumber the welfare state. In practical terms this means, for example, that the New Politics of Welfare encourages formal labor-market participation and private pensions, health care insurance, and other nonpublic measures that reduce the collective burden. Everyone should take their share in reducing the “contingencies of the life cycle.”

The state–market–civil society nexus has two faces in Zijderveld’s analysis, one ideological, the other democratic. Ideologically, the state is associated with socialism, the market with liberalism, and civil society with conservatism. Participation in all realms is crucial to arrive at a democratic society, or as Zijderveld puts it, a “Democratic Triangle.” Acknowledging the potential conflicts between participation in the three spheres, Zijderveld argues for their balanced mix. Hence, for example, equality of participation in state-regulated activities should not come at the expense of either the efficiency of the market or the morality of civil society. Moreover, Zijderveld warns against letting any one of the three corners in the democratic and ideological triangle dominate the others; fundamentalism in either way is harmful. Extreme doses of liberalism may result in radically libertarian and anarchistic groups, too much socialism and etatism stifles development and autonomy, and conservatism risks being perverted into reactionary fascism.

On a general level the two authors agree that the welfare state is changing fundamentally toward placing more emphasis on the role and logic of the market and civil society with their inherent inegalitarian aspects. For Jordan the consequences of putting too much trust in the market as the source of economic and moral prosperity are quite grave. Apart from neglecting or even failing to address existing patterns of inequality, the new politics of welfare is itself promoting further marginalization of already vulnerable groups, especially those with only a feeble affiliation to the labor market. In making his overall remark on the effects of the new politics of welfare, Jordan emphasizes the semi-authoritarian strategies inherent in the political program:

Throughout this book I have argued that the new orthodoxy leads to a politics of welfare that is moralistic, authoritarian and intolerant; that divides the working class on lines of perceived “deservingness” and moral worth, and mobilizes the self-righteous and judgmental majority against those they neither know nor understand; and that it drives up enforcement costs, and ends by spending most of the welfare budget on control, surveillance, compulsion or correction.”(190)

Zijderveld, on the other hand, has a much more positive view of recent changes to the welfare state in Northern Europe:

The waning of the comprehensive welfare state in Europe which entails the restoration of the Democratic Triangle is a process of transformation which carries many risks and insecurities. But it will in the end strengthen Europe’s political, economic, and sociocultural stamina. (167) The New Politics of Welfare and The Waning of the Welfare State contribute to the comparative welfare state literature. Their main strength is their theoretical contribution to the field, that is, their articulation of ideas about the background for change and its direction. The New Politics of Welfare should first and foremost be considered an insightful and well-informed contribution to the criticism of the new orthodoxy rather than a social-reformist project in itself. The Waning of the Welfare State gives American readers an opportunity to get a taste of the Christian-conservative view on the development of continental European welfare states. However, none of the contributions, particularly Zijderveld’s, are convincing in bringing new evidence of the reality of change. This prohibits the authors from evaluating to what extent the irresistible forces of, respectively, global socio-economic change and cultural change are differentiated by different institutional types of welfare states. Indeed, much seems to indicate that national governments and societies are in a different situation with regard to accommodating these pressures. And the American or third way is not necessarily the only or best option for the Northwestern European welfare states; other modes of adaptation may prove equally appropriate. Comparative policy analysis of Realpolitik may shed more light on the variety of ways in which the European welfare states accommodate to forces of economic, cultural, and social globalization.

References

Kautto, M., M. Heikkilä, B. Hvinden, S. Marklund, and N. Ploug. 1999. Nordic Social Policy. Changing Welfare States. London: Routledge.

Lichbach, M. I., and A. S. Zuckerman, eds. 1997. Comparative Politics—Rationality, Culture, and Structure. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Ragin, C. 1994. Constructing Social Research—The Unity and Diversity of Method. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.