| Review of: | Holding the Line: Race, Racism, and American Foreign Policy toward Africa, 1953-1961 by George White, Jr. |
|---|---|
| Reviewed By: | Thomas J. Noer |
| Reviewed in: | Diplomatic History |
| Date accepted online: | 14/01/2008 |
| Published in print: | Volume 31, Issue 04, Pages 771-774 |
Book Review: A Whiter Shade of Pale: Ike, Race, and Africa
Over two decades ago, I bemoaned the lack of attention to U.S. policy toward Africa and suggested it remained the "dark continent" for historians of American foreign relations. Fortunately, this is no longer the case, as there are now a number of excellent studies of U.S. involvement with individual African nations and particularly the influence of racial attitudes on diplomacy. Given the abundance and richness of recent scholarship, it is now possible to move beyond a focus on specific nations and events and work toward broader studies of Washington's relations with Africa and the impact of racial attitudes on U.S. policy. George White, Jr. has attempted such an approach in
Any historian of America and Africa has to deal with racial attitudes, assumptions, and stereotypes, and try to determine their impact on policy and policymakers. To George White, racism was not just a component of U.S.-African relations: it was the dominant element that controlled all interaction with the continent. White argues racial attitudes resulted from an all-encompassing concept of "Whiteness" that served as "a hegemonic force, making White people appear to be not only
Whiteness was so unquestioned and prevalent that it was the source of all policy and diplomatic decisions in Washington. It led U.S. officials to view Africans as infantile, incapable of self-rule or economic development, and dependent on the culturally, politically, and economically "superior" Europeans and Americans to survive. Black Africans were not seen as individuals capable of participating in politics or diplomacy, but as objects to be manipulated and controlled. Warped by the lens of Whiteness, U.S. officials assumed Africa was "a place where poverty was as natural as European wealth, a place of cultural depravity and deviance, a place where most people were content with Western guidance."
Having defined "Whiteness" and asserting its pervasive power, the author then tries to illustrate its impact in five brief chapters (totaling 108 pages) that examine the Eisenhower administration's policies toward African nationalism, Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa, and the Congo. His conclusions are predictable and often repetitious. "The Eisenhower administration's policy regarding decolonization warped reality to fit the imperatives of Whiteness" (p. 37). "American support for African political independence required that Africans subordinate their interests and concerns to those of the West .... As a result of policies colored by Whiteness, the United States effectively undermined the ideas of freedom and democracy which it preached" (p. 61). Americans saw Ghana's leader Kwame Nkrumah as "childlike and impressionistic" and were "woefully ignorant of Nkrumah's intelligence and political savvy" (p. 74). "White officials ...demanded unconditional, uncritical obedience from non-White leaders" (p. 78). "American support for African political independence required that Africans subordinate their interests and concerns to those of the West" (p. 87). "American policymakers considered the moral dimensions of subverting the normal operations of White Supremacy and found it abhorrent. To ask Whites to be ruled by Blacks was not simply immoral; it was tantamount to blasphemy!" (pp. 101-2). Washington saw South Africa's white Afrikaners as "proud, engaging, and intellectual; Black South Africans were sullen, resentful, and prone to violence" (p. 108). As the Congolese were incapable of self-rule, "the future of the Congo lay with a dictatorship, the United States wanted to anoint the dictator" (p. 115). "To restore order in the colony, they needed an authoritarian figure. Their belief in the infantile character of African peoples demanded no less" (p. 119). "The Eisenhower administration believed that Africans were emotional, irrational, and prone to violence against Whites. They concluded that putting guns in the hands of such people could lead to unpredictable results, harmful to American interests" (p. 127). The United States was dedicated to "the maintenance of a hierarchy of nations with Africans chained to the bottom" (p. 129). Eisenhower's advisers "considered Blacks to be unfit for self-rule" (p. 134). "White elites could not imagine a world in which Blacks governed their own affairs" (p. 136). "American decision-makers refused to hear evidence of African competence or complaints. They constructed an image of the African based on White Supremacists' fantasies of Blacks" (p. 139).
Such a mono casual explanation eliminates all nuances and subtlety and ignores all dissent. Too often, theory overrides evidence and conclusions seem predetermined. Certainly racial prejudice (overt and covert) influenced U.S. policy toward African independence, but there were other factors. The author suggests historians have overemphasized Cold War anticommunism as a guiding element in African policy. Perhaps so, but it still was important. U.S. officials did see the continent as a battleground with Marxism and did fear "premature independence" would lead to instability and Communist gains. America's desire for stability in the Congo was not just "to support Belgian interests in the Congo" (p. 75) but to prevent Soviet influence. Washington did not see Nkrumah as "childlike" but were alarmed by his acceptance of Soviet military aid. Even the most Eurocentric officials in Washington denounced South Africa's policy of apartheid and feared it would lead to violence and possible Communist influence.
There were also many in the administration who supported African independence, accepted neutralism, and argued for expanded economic assistance to the continent. Regardless of their views of racial equality, they felt poverty bred instability and instability invited Soviet or Chinese influence. Vice President Richard Nixon lobbied successfully for the creation of a Bureau of African Affairs, expanded economic aid, and more attention to African issues not because he rejected notions of white supremacy but to counter possible Communist influence. Even White acknowledges that not "all U.S. opinion regarding the Congo or the Belgians was uniform" and that there was criticism of Belgium's military intervention (p. 132), but we do not hear any of these voices. Nor do we hear critics, especially African Americans, outside the government who denounced Eisenhower's reluctant support of decolonization and lack of support for the end of white rule in South Africa and Angola.
The author also includes a number of digressions that, while occasionally interesting, seem unessential in such an extremely brief narrative. (Five pages on American relations with Haiti; seven on
[1]Thomas J. Noer, "Non-Benign Neglect: The United States and Black Africa in the Twentieth Century," in