Book Reviews

'Must global politics constrain democracy? No. Does such politics constrain democracy in the United States and elsewhere? Markedly. In the gulf between these two responses lies the need for renewed debate and democratic movements' (222). So concludes Alan Gilbert at the end of his important new book. And within the gulf between these two answers lies the enormous spectrum of topics he analyzes in the previous five chapters. While trying to bridge the gulf between an 'anti-democratic feedback of global politics' and the maintenance of domestic as well as international democracy, Gilbert's 'modern democratic realism' (14) is occasionally confusing, sometimes fizzles out, and at other junctures seems insufficiently detailed. Fortunately, he reminds the reader from time to time of the thread connecting the different parts of the story.

Gilbert tries to connect political philosophy with international relations theory. That is the strength of his volume. He clears up realist and neorealist misreadings of allegedly 'realist' ideas in Thucydides, Aristotle, and Hobbes (ch. IV), while critically charging realists and neorealists with moral blindness in respect to the anti-democratic feedback of international power rivalry. That blindness is based on their view of domestic and international politics as radically distinct spheres of politics, as well as their supposition of a value-free - in his view, apolitical - political science (ch. I, esp. 41ff). By doing so, he clears the floor for 'the transformation of realism into democratic internationalism' (86). His thesis is new and surprising insofar as he makes a distinction between an 'official realism' and a 'sophisticated realism.' According to Gilbert, in the context of the experience of the Vietnam War and its negative impact on democracy in the US (CIA espionage, military conscription), sophisticated realism was transformed into a 'democratic internationalism' (Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and George F. Kennan) that overcame the distinction between domestic and international affairs by gaining analytic and moral awareness of a nexus between them (41). That nexus is threefold: first, the anti-democratic feedback of global power rivalry on domestic democracy; second, the influence of international power politics on domestic democratization via the emergence of domestic protest movements which stand up to their own war-making government(s); third, the emergence of international solidarity among different groups oppressed by anti-democratic feedback. 'Sophisticated realism,' a form of realism that recognizes these three points and is thereby transformed into a 'realist, democratic internationalism,' serves as a new paradigm for Gilbert's conceptualization of his own theory (73).

En route to such a theory Gilbert touches on a diversity of complex issues: the internal contradictions of realism and neorealism as well as their failings vis-à-vis 'democratic internationalism' (or what he also calls 'sophisticated realism') (chs. I and II); Marx as the first theorist of a 'real democratic internationalism' (ch. III); Athenian democratic theory and Hobbes as paradigms for anti-realistic, democratic viewpoints on domestic-international interrelations (ch. IV); and finally, the problems of formulating a new theory of 'democratic deliberation' with reference to international as well as domestic politics (ch. V). It is no wonder that this broad spectrum of issues is difficult to domesticate, and thus that Gilbert's discussion is both overloaded and sometimes too thin, depending on the particular issue at hand.

In the following, I want to provide some examples of my complaints about Gilbert's argumentative trajectory in Chapters I to IV. Most confusing is Gilbert's use of some key terms from current debates in international relations: there are no clear specifications of important terms such as 'international,' 'global,' and 'transnational.' Thus, 'transnational' sometimes seems to be used identically with what he calls 'democratic international' (19). Yet this seems implausible since many studies in international politics underline the actual - or at least potential - anti-democratic consequences of transnational politics. The identification of 'transnational' with 'democratic international' underscores Gilbert's deep faith that politics from below (as we see in transnational movements consisting of non-governmental agents) is democratic per se, not only because it derives from the demos, but in terms of its substantive commitments as well (106). This assumption sometimes looks naive, especially in Gilbert's interpretation of Marx as the 'founding father' of democratic internationalism (122) and his understanding of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas as a democratic (liberation) movement directed at the anti-democratic consequences of US power politics in Central America for Nicaraguan society. Ignoring the substantive quality of a particular policy while judging it as democratic or anti-democratic is no virtue for an author who refers freely to ancient ethics and philosophers like Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates (151).

One cannot help but underline the lack of a reason why he accepts the realist assumption that international politics consists of 'power politics' and 'great power rivalry.' Given the numerous critiques of realist and neorealist methodology he mentions, it is surprising that Gilbert (explicitly) accepts their picture of international power rivalry (26) when describing his own theory as a 'new, democratic realism.' All the more confusing is the fact that he does not provide any justification for that commonality with realism and neorealism. One can only suppose that his reason for sharing realist and neorealist assumptions might consist in the acknowledgment of the historical fact of power politics. But unfortunately such historical facts (here, chiefly the Vietnam War) are the same ones on which he bases his arguments against realism and neorealism and their core distinction between a domestic and an international sphere of politics. Gilbert also criticizes political science categorically for its 'oligarchic' character and traditions, claiming that it suffers from a lack of reflection about the peaceful and non-aggressive character of 'internationalism' and accusing it of harboring sympathies for power politics and the national 'military-administrative-industrial' complex (he mostly has US political science in mind) (185). Maintaining some relics of Marxist theory, according to which political science is an integral part of the system of elite domination, while simultaneously assuming the genuine moral superiority of 'the oppressed,' Gilbert overlooks a whole branch of political science that actually did focus on 'internationalism' - specifically, on transnational relations. Writers like Aron, Rosenau, Kaiser, Keohane, and Nye have analyzed not only powerful agents (such as multinational companies), but immigrants and international non-governmental organizations (human rights, environmental, women, and civil rights movements) as well - in other words, precisely those groups which according to Gilbert make up the 'oppressed' (190).

Gilbert repeatedly ignores important lines of argumentation within past and present political science; this becomes especially clear in Chapter V and its conceptualization of 'democratic realism.' While discussing the very important question of the prospect of democratizing international politics, he relies emphatically on concepts of democratic participation and deliberation from authors such as Benjamin Barber and Amy Gutmann. At the same time, he criticizes David Held's concept of a 'cosmopolitan democracy' as utopian (206). The problem with Gilbert's argument is that he fails to ask (or answer) the question of how such concepts of deliberation and participation - conceptualized mostly within the context of the nation-state - can work in international (better: transnational) political arenas. Indeed, Gilbert provides only a very brief comment concerning the necessity of turning domestic democracy into global democracy. Yet he does not provide a theoretical explanation of how such a transformation can and should work (186). By not addressing that question, he neglects a series of recent contributions from James Goodman, Fritz Scharpf, and Anthony McGrew. He simultaneously argues against Held, however, who at least did develop a model of democracy transferable to transnational politics - in other words, precisely Gilbert's own unfulfilled agenda. The argument of utopianism is not credible compared to the project pursued by Gilbert himself, namely the institutionalization of 'global regimes [internationally linked, non-governmental organizations] that handle conflict without war' (216).

To sum up, Gilbert's book leaves many questions unanswered. He ignores too many core discussions in political science. Although he identifies a wide array of current problems, questions, and debates, he too often just touches on a few aspects of them. I wish that he had discussed a more selective set of questions and then had exhibited the same depth and thoroughness we are used to from his former writings.