Book Reviews

In Democratic Justice, Ian Shapiro wants to rise to the challenge implicit in the popular identification of democracy and justice. A democratic conception of social justice constrains the power relations in the different domains of social life so as to promote 'opportunities for those affected by the operation of a collective practice both to participate in its governance and to oppose its results when they are so inclined' (62). What these presumptions in favor of universal inclusion and meaningful opposition entail will vary depending on which culture, which domain of social interaction, and which stage of the life cycle from birth to death is under investigation. Shapiro focuses on the different power relations that structure the course of a typical American life-cycle. He is not offering a blueprint of social justice, or trying to design a just society from scratch. Instead, he partially defers to 'insider's wisdom' or accepted ways of doing things. By democratizing the power relations bound up with our activities, we will be bequeathing a more just world to our children than the world we inherited.

In his chapter on childhood, Shapiro argues that parents and the state should be seen as 'parallel fiduciaries' (78). A hierarchical relationship between adults and children is inevitable, because children are not initially capable of self-governance. However, a fiduciary model limits parents' or the state's authority over children, because fiduciaries are required to act in the interests of their charges, and as parallel fiduciaries, parents and the state can act as checks on each other's authority over children. Shapiro argues that public officials should be primary custodians of children's basic interests and secondary custodians of their best interests, while parents should be primary custodians of children's best interests and secondary custodians of their basic interests (81). Shapiro is sharply critical of current American practice regarding children. In 1992, 14.6 million American children were living in poverty, and at the same time, American politicians were bemoaning the decline in family values and the number of children born out of wedlock, and were seeking to curtail these trends by advocating the establishment of 'character education' programs at public schools (108), and by increasing the costs of single parenthood. Hence, not only was the American government failing miserably in its fiduciary responsibility to underwrite children's basic interests, but it was also seeking to ride roughshod over parents' primary fiduciary responsibility for children's best interests.

For Shapiro, basic interests 'concern the security, nutrition, health, and education required for children to develop into normal adults' (85). Developing into normal adults includes developing 'the capacities required to function adequately and responsibly in the prevailing economic, technological, and institutional system, governed as a democracy, over the course of their lives' (86). Best interests concern 'the full development of human potential' (90-1). I may be appalled by what other parents regard as in their child's best interests, but so long as it does not violate the child's basic interests, then neither I nor the state is permitted to interfere. However, if a parent's pursuit of best interests conflicts with the state's understanding of basic interests, then the state should intervene. For this reason, the state is right, according to Shapiro, to overrule attempts by Christian Scientists to withhold essential medical care from their children (93). More controversially, Shapiro feels the court was also right, in Mozert v. Hawkins City Board Of Education, to override the attempt of Christian fundamentalist parents to prevent their children reading texts that challenged gender stereotypes. The readings were designed to encourage the making of critical judgments, and this capacity promotes the values of democratic citizenship (264-5, n. 63).

I agree with Shapiro's assessment of the court case, but Shapiro never fully explains why we have a basic interest in democracy. Shapiro suggests we all have a basic interest in being able to function adequately within the existing system (87), but if the existing system were not democratic, would we instead have a basic interest in developing the insider's wisdom needed to prevail in that system? Other sections of Shapiro's book suggest his commitment to democracy is not this contingent. Shapiro describes democracy as a 'subordinate, foundational good' (21). Democracy is a subordinate good because it should shape the terms of our common interactions without being the point of those interactions, and hence Shapiro does not regard political participation as the superordinate good for human beings (24). Still, when it comes to explaining why democracy is foundational, all Shapiro says is that 'no prior or more basic institutional commitment rightly commands our allegiance' (21). At the very end of his text, Shapiro states that democracy's 'value derives from the hope it holds out of making the world a more just place', and that what is important about democracy is its 'capacity to promote inclusion and erode domination' (240). Shapiro's closing statements merely reiterate his preferred interpretation of democracy and his belief that the concepts of democracy and justice can be mutually implicating, rather than clarify why we have a basic interest in democracy.

In adult domestic relations, the presumptions in favor of collective self-government and meaningful opposition support viewing marriage as a contract where both parties have a unilateral right to divorce, rather than as a publicly imposed status. People themselves, not governments, should decide on the terms of domestic association. However, contracts facilitate domination when there are power disparities between the contracting parties. Currently in the United States, domestic labor is undervalued, and when men and women divorce, women's unequal earning power is exacerbated by problems they face re-entering the workforce. To compensate for this disparity, a 'regulated no-fault regime' (126) should regulate the terms - but not the grounds - of divorce to make sure that everyone can continue to vindicate their basic interests after divorce. Another problem with the current American system is that resources tend to be tied to a spouse's employment. A better system would be to have a robust social wage providing universal healthcare, unemployment compensation, and pensions. This would provide less scope for domination within domestic relations, since capacities to exit would be more equal. Paradoxically, a more robust social wage means that government can be less interventionist in regulating the economic terms of divorce, because the robust social wage would underwrite people's basic interests.

Shapiro develops a similar argument in his chapter on work. The closer a society is to a 'surfer's paradise' (184), where the state underwrites everyone's basic interests, the lighter should be the quantum of proof that employers must bear in discharge disputes with employees, but the closer the society is to a 'Dickensian nightmare' (184), where there are no collective provisions, the higher should be the burden of proof borne by employers. Burden shifting of this kind is the exception rather than the rule in contemporary American practice, but Shapiro thinks his approach gives employers incentives to support a robust social wage, because then firms could have more managerial flexibility and a freer hand with respect to layoffs (187). In general, Shapiro accepts that hierarchies are often necessary within firms, but shifting the burden of proof onto employers, and the sliding-quantum rule, prevent business hierarchies from atrophying into domination.

When discussing life's ending, Shapiro is critical of the fact that over 41 million Americans currently have no health insurance (200). Also, technological advances have resulted in massive expenditure on the end of life, and these Medicare costs are being externalized onto the poor, more and more of whom are losing their Medicaid eligibility (207). Against these trends, Shapiro argues that society is 'collectively responsible for underwriting the basic interests of its members over the course of the life cycle' (204), and for Shapiro this implies that there should be some form of universal healthcare. When it comes to deciding how much medical care should be part of the basic interests guarantee, and how scarce resources should be rationed, Shapiro's rule of thumb is a cousin of his sliding-quantum rule: if a democratic legislature decides on an insurance scheme that will apply to almost everyone, then we can be less suspicious of trade-offs and rationing decisions. However, if it decides on a system that will be used by very few - for example, Medicaid in the United States today - then there should be meaningful opportunities to protest rationing decisions. With regard to decision-making within the budget constraints that prevail, democratic justice recommends letting the elderly make their own decisions, up until the point where disenfranchising the elderly becomes a necessity, and then decision-making should devolve to 'delegates-cum-fiduciaries,' who must decide what the elderly person would have decided if he or she were not incapacitated (223).

Overall, I think that Democratic Justice is full of useful, progressive suggestions about how to reshape existing American social relations, but given Shapiro's harsh indictment of current American practice, I think he sells himself short by describing his approach as a form of radicalized or 'tempered Burkeanism' (128). Shapiro grants presumptive, though debatable, legitimacy to existing ways of doing things, but it seems to me that his motivation for doing so differs substantially from Edmund Burke's. What lurks behind Burke's commitment to existing ways of doing things is a paternalistic strain and a faith in hierarchies that are entirely absent from Shapiro's account. Shapiro wants to let people decide matters for themselves. He grants partial allegiance to existing social relations because he wants his theory to be useful, and because, unlike theories that focus on the question of a just basic structure, Shapiro wants to engage directly with existing institutions and everyday politics (232). I commend this aspiration, and Shapiro succeeds in living up to it. But to characterize the approach as Burkean, no matter how radicalized or tempered, can create the impression that Shapiro's political outlook is conservative, rather than progressive.

Finally, Shapiro's account of democratizing power relations tends to emphasize the vindication of basic interests, but is the mere vindication of basic interests sufficient for justice? Shapiro argues that if the social wage is robust, then the quantum of proof required of employers to justify layoffs falls. However, even if the social wage is sufficient to underwrite basic interests and an employee is unfairly dismissed, should not this unfair dismissal be a topic of concern for a democratic conception of social justice? Similarly, Shapiro suggests that child custody disputes are not a matter of central concern for democratic justice, once the child's basic interests are vindicated (136), but given that child custody is the most litigated aspect of divorce in the United States today, Shapiro's cursory treatment of the topic seems inadequate. It is the minimal nature of Shapiro's account of basic interests that makes his mere focus on their vindication seem incomplete. It is humbling to realize that what explains Shapiro's focus on the vindication of basic interests is the inexcusable failure of the contemporary United States to provide millions of its citizens with even these minimal resources.